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ABSTRACT
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VARIATION AND RELIABILITY IN DIGITAL CMOS CIRCUIT DESIGN
by Massoud Mokhtarpour Ghahroodi
The silicon chip industry continues to provide devices with feature sizes at Ultra-
Deep-Sub-Micron (UDSM) dimensions. This results in higher device density and
lower power and cost per function. While this trend is positive, there are a num-
ber of negative side eects, including the increased device parameter variation,
increased sensitivity to soft errors, and lower device yields. The lifetime of next-
generation devices is also decreasing due to lower reliability margins and shorter
product lifetimes.
This thesis presents an investigation into the challenges of UDSM CMOS circuit
design, with a review of the research conducted in this eld. This investigation
has led to the development of a methodology to determine the timing vulnerability
factors of UDSM CMOS that leads to a more realistic denition of the Window of
Vulnerability (WOV) for Soft-Error-Rate (SER) computation.
We present an implementation of a Radiation-Hardened 32-bit Pipe-lined Proces-
sor as well as two novel radiation-hardening techniques at Gate-level. We present
a Single-Event-Upset (SEU) tolerant Flip-Flop design with 38% less power over-
head and 25% less area overhead at 65nm technology, compared to the conventional
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) technique for Flip-Flop design. We also pro-
pose an approach for in-eld repair (IFR) by trading area for reliability. In the
case of permanent faults, spare logic blocks will replace the faulty blocks on the y.
The simulation results show that by tolerating approximately 70% area overhead
and less than 18% power overhead, the reliability is increased by a factor of x10
to x100 for various component failure rates.Contents
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1.1 Motivations For Research
This work is motivated by the challenges faced in designing reliable circuits in
modern technology nodes. As the feature size of CMOS devices shrink to Ultra-
Deep-Sub-Micron (UDSM) dimensions, intrinsic parameter uctuations of atomic
scale transistors drastically impact the power, performance and yield of manufac-
tured chips and limit the scaling and integration of them. In other words, due
to intrinsic variations, unavoidable in modern fabrication processes, the taped-out
chips can vary radically as every single UDSM transistor out of the billions of
transistors on a die have dierent characteristics.
Moreover the incredible growth and complexity of semiconductor fabrication fa-
cilities has resulted in the isolation of process/device engineers from circuit design
engineers, leading to some lack of understanding of the impact of circuit designs
upon manufacturability and testability due to the fundamental limitations of tech-
nology and device physics. Most of today's technologies are subject to very high
defect density. Increasing defect density decreases yield and with such a high de-
fect densities in UDSM chips, the manufacturing costs can be prohibitively high,
making chip yield a critical metric for manufacturers. From a performance point
of view, the circuit must meet its speed requirements over a range of voltages and
temperatures that reect the environment in which the circuit will operate; while
the performance requirements must be met at a set of worst-case conditions for
speed, the power requirements must be simultaneously met at another set of worst
case conditions.
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Moreover, from a reliability perspective, the incidence of transient errors increases
at UDSM dimensions, and consequently, the dependability of the systems de-
creases. Reliability is therefore another required metric for every UDSM-based
system in general and safety-critical systems in particular.
Therefore any design methodology must consider the Power, Performance, Yield
and Reliability gures of merit in the design and manufacturing ow. At present,
there are neither methodologies nor EDA tools that can capture the full complexity
of these problems and be used successfully to predict both the characteristics and
scale of the intrinsic uctuations in UDSM transistors and interconnects, and their




Power consumption which is the rate of energy dissipation in a system is always an
important issue; but due to the technology scaling to UDSM dimensions with more
and more transistors on a chip, power consumption, thermal and cooling issues
are some of the major problems in chip design especially for battery operated
devices. Although the dominant factor of power consumption is the dynamic
power dissipation which is related to the operating voltage, frequency, capacitance
and the required performance specications, at UDSM, leakage power dissipation
is not ignorable anymore, in such a way that as reported in the literature, leakage
power will represent up to 40 percent of total power consumption in near-future
devices [25].
1.2.2 Performance
As the name suggests, higher performance or faster computation is always de-
sired. However applying today's design methodologies and traditional determin-
istic worst-case timing analysis at UDSM is too pessimistic [12]. Moreover, due
to the unavoidable variations in global buer loads and interconnect wire length,
the global clock signal arrives at dierent components at dierent times. This
phenomenon which is known as the clock skew makes the traditional globallyChapter 1 Introduction 3
synchronous design methodology impractical; because the clock signal cannot be
distributed to all of the millions of ip-ops and registers on the chip at the same
time signicantly degrading the achievable clock speed.
1.2.3 Yield
Generally, the key metric in determining the success of a technology in chip design
(especially from the market perspective) is the number of devices on the die which
are fully functional and applicable. This generally necessitates that every single
transistor out of billions of transistors on a chip work properly. This issue is known
as yield. Any malfunction in a single device can potentially lead to yield loss.
This yield loss can be either catastrophic or parametric; catastrophic yield loss is
caused by physical defects (such as stuck-at, opens, bridging faults) which typically
manifest themselves as functional failures on the chip , leading to defective chips
which must be thrown away. In parametric yield loss, manufactured devices do
not perform according to the design specication i.e. chip functionality is correct
but they may work slower or consume more power than expected in the design
process.
For a long time the parametric yield was not considered serious and catastrophic
yield loss was the main yield issue and various solutions such as adding redundancy
and fault-defect tolerant methodologies were used to surmount this type of yield
loss. But at UDSM dimensions, not only catastrophic yield loss is important but
due to the variations, the parametric yield loss is rapidly increasing as well [26].
1.2.4 Reliability
Semiconductor manufacturing continues to provide smaller feature sizes resulting
in lower power, higher density, and lower cost per function. While this trend is pos-
itive, there are a number of negative side eects, including increased semiconductor
parameter variability, increased sensitivity to soft errors, and lower device yields.
These issues become more and more important for the semiconductor industry
and modelling is increasingly required to provide design tools not only to achieve
better device performance but also more robust reliability margins. Dependability,
or the ability of a system to function correctly under given operating conditions
during a given period of time can be quantied using measures of Reliability or
Failure In Time (FIT). The lifetime of next-generation devices is decreasing due4 Chapter 1 Introduction
to lower reliability margins and shorter product lifetimes putting the reliability
and dependability of such systems at stake [10].
Another major emerging reliability problem that cannot be furthermore ignored in
UDSM technologies is the susceptibility to Soft Errors. As clearly stated in The In-
ternational Technology Roadmap For Semiconductors(ITRS) 2009-2011 [24]:"The
impact of Soft Error Rate (SER) over the years is almost constant or even increas-
ing in spite of the reduced sensitivity for the single units due to device scaling and
the use of countermeasures (e.g., SOI, redundancy, error detection and correction).
This is because of the corresponding increase of the number of units in a system.
Viable models and simulators are still lacking to extrapolate the SER from the
cell up to the system level from accelerated tests, which are able to keep track of
the error propagation and to provide enough statistical accuracy."
1.3 Objectives
The main objectives of this research are:
￿ To investigate the impacts of variation and reliability issues on UDSM CMOS
circuits from a design perspective.
￿ To investigate timing vulnerability of UDSM combinational circuits and
present a more realistic methodology to determine the vulnerability.
￿ To investigate timing vulnerability of UDSM sequential circuits and state-
holding elements and propose a possible hardening-by-design solution.
￿ To investigate ageing and the reliability issues of UDSM circuits and proces-
sors and propose a repair mechanism to avoid fatal shut-downs.
1.4 Contributions
This thesis provides a survey of various UDSM impacts on circuits and devices,
reviewing current research and providing a summary of the state-of-the-art tech-
niques to mitigate the UDSM impacts. Moreover, techniques are introduced to
deal with UDSM impacts in terms of performance and reliability. These include
a novel radiation-hardened ip-op design and an in-eld logic repair mechanism
for UDSM reliable circuit design.Chapter 1 Introduction 5
1.5 Thesis Structure
In this chapter, the main problems, obstacles and motivations for this research have
been briey presented. The second chapter provides a survey of various UDSM
impacts on circuits and devices in the literature and the existing techniques to
tackle them. First, the pre-silicon or design-time techniques are discussed and
then post-silicon or run-time solutions are provided, followed by a brief survey
of the reliability issues. Chapter 3 addresses timing vulnerabilities mainly due
to soft errors in combinational logic. Chapter 4 discusses timing vulnerability of
sequential circuits and state-holding elements. Chapter 5 provides a discussion of
other reliability issues such as ageing and possible in-eld repairable architectures.
The last chapter summarises the conclusions of the thesis.Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this chapter, we take a brief survey of the major impacts of UDSM scaling
on design. First we discuss process and intrinsic parameter variations, and their
impacts on Performance and Power consumption. Then we take a brief survey
of the eects of radiation and soft errors on UDSM CMOS circuits. Afterwards,
the major reliability issues will be discussed and nally, state-of-the-art and the
proposed solutions in the literature to tackle process variation and to mitigate soft
errors and the reliability issues will be discussed.
2.1 Process Variation
One of the major impacts of UDSM on logic are increased levels of fabrication pro-
cess variation and additional random uncertainties caused by the random place-
ment of dopant atoms in the channel of each transistor at UDSM dimensions. This
intrinsic randomness of the placement of atoms, along with the extrinsic limita-
tions in controlling the manufacturing process and its precision, have impacted
various parameters such as oxide thickness (Tox), threshold voltage (Vth) and tran-
sistor channel length (L) directly. The impacts of process variation are not limited
to the transistors. Interconnect parameter variation on wire height (H) and wire
width (WM) are also increasing dramatically. Such phenomena will result in huge
variation in gate delays and interconnect delays. Moreover due to nanometre scale
geometries of devices with very thin (angstrom scale) gate oxide layers, the reli-
ability issues of such UDSM designs have been increasing at very high rates [27]
[28] [29].
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This is mainly due to the inability of semiconductor manufacturing industries to
improve tolerance levels in the fabrication-lithography stage and keep up with the
technology scaling. For instance, the light source (with a wavelength of 193 nm)
used in lithography in older technologies (above 130 nm) is still used in newer
technologies [30]. Lithography tolerances are limited by the granularity of the
resist materials. for UDSM process, various immersion and multiple exposures
lithography techniques are used which will result more expensive manufacturing
processes.
The doping density of the transistor channel is the major determinant of threshold
voltage in bulk and polysilicon gate MOSFETs. To achieve the desired doping
density and consequently the desired threshold voltage, certain number of dopant
atoms are required. Due to the fact that the implantation of dopant atoms in
devices is random, the eventual exact number of dopant atoms in the transistor
channel is also random. Because of technology scaling, such number of atoms
in the channel region is becoming smaller, as the channel volume decreases, and
thus the relative eect of a single change in dopant number is increasing [30] [31].
There is a similar situation for interconnects, however the main factors which are
responsible for variation in interconnects are the limitations in process control over
the manufacturing process.
Figure 2.1: Variation in threshold voltage of devices [1]Chapter 2 Literature Review 9
Fig. 2.1, shows how the variance of the threshold voltage of an NMOS transistor
has almost doubled between the 45nm and the130nm technology nodes. It can
also be seen that the absolute value of the threshold voltage in 130nm technology
is about 0.35V which is higher than 45nm technology (0.28V approx.). Hence
the prediction of the device behaviors and eventually estimating the circuit per-
formance metrics in the presence of device and interconnect variation is a major
challenge for the chip industry.
From manufacturing perspective, one can classify the sources of variation in the
transistor threshold voltage into two main categories: Global and Local. Global
variation is caused by manufacturing process variations and local intrinsic variation
is caused by local parameter uctuations. For short channel transistors (channel
length = 20nm in 45nm technology), the threshold voltage variation is caused by
transistors geometries, and specically the Le parameter which can be classied
as being local. In the case of long channel (channel length = 40nm in 45nm
technology) transistors, the variation on Vth is mainly due to dopant diusions,
gate dielectric thickness, ion implantation and so forth that can be considered as
being global [32]. For long channel transistors it is the average dopant diusion
that is more important. As shown in Fig. 2.2, the source and drain doping is very
dense, but the channel doping is very vulnerable to variation.
Figure 2.2: Random placement of dopant atoms a 50-nm channel-length
MOSFET [2]10 Chapter 2 Literature Review
From another perspective, we can categorize variation as being either random or
systematic [30] [33] [34]. Random physical eects such as poly-silicon gate line-
edge roughness, random uctuations of the number and the location of dopant
atoms in the MOSFET channel and so forth [35] [33] [30]. Systematic variations
are usually due to spatial dependencies of the manufacturing mechanisms for de-
vice processing, such as variation in chemical mechanical polishing (CMP) which
produces predictable variation trends across the die [36], or predictable variations
such as those caused by optical proximity eects [37].
It is also noteworthy to mention that when comparing the delay contribution of
device variation to interconnect variation, delay variations due to interconnect are
still less signicant and device variations still hold the biggest share of the total
delay variability in UDSM technologies [30]. The contribution of uctuations in
device parameters is about 90% of the total delay variation of a design in the real
world [33].
2.1.1 Performance
Typically, the performance of a circuit is determined by the speed of the circuit
which is rated by the operating clock frequency. Delays are generally the bound-
aries that determine this operating frequency. The rate at which information can
propagate through the circuit depends on the longest path delay, and from a syn-
chronous design perspective, the maximum clock frequency of a circuit is limited
by the path with the maximum delay. Variation in process parameters will cause
distributed small delay variations along any given path and when summed up, the
path can become timing critical and even fail to meet the timing constraints, hence
the chip can fail as a result. Random variations can cause a signicant mismatch
in the electrical performance of two identical devices placed next to each other.
On the other hand, performance and timing verication in the presence of process
variation is dicult because the critical path is no longer unique. This means dif-
ferent paths can become timing critical depending on the process-voltage corners
that the manufactured chip is coming from. Therefore Critical Path selection and
analysis cannot be deterministic anymore [38].Chapter 2 Literature Review 11
2.1.2 Power Consumption
Power consumption and thermal issues have always been important, but due to the
high device density and integration of logic with UDSM dimensions, the problem
has become even more serious. While dynamic power dissipation is the dominant
component in the total power consumption, in UDSM, leakage power in forms of
gate leakage or sub-threshold leakage is increasingly becoming a severe problem
[39].
Thermal issues and generated heat in to days and future high performance and
highly integrated devices is another signicant factor. Dynamic power consump-
tion activity can produce local hot spots on the die. These local hot spots can
be several tens of degrees hotter than the rest of the die, even after application
of the best cooling techniques to the package itself. As depicted in Fig. 2.3, a
temperature dierence of 40C to 50C corresponds to a 20 percent performance
variation [3].
Figure 2.3: Temperature dierences on a die: 40C to 50C temperature
dierence leads to 20% performance variation [3]12 Chapter 2 Literature Review
As it can be seen in Fig. 2.3, there are huge temperature dierences between the
cache area and the core area, with the core area being much hotter and the cache
region is much colder also depicted in Fig. 2.4. This non-uniformity in thermal
gradients is very prevalent in micro processors and it can be observed by doing
local calculation (or local sensing) on the power densities at dierent locations on a
chip. From a dynamic power dissipation point of view, slower devices are the result
of higher temperatures. However according to the power consumption formula (i.e.
C  V 2  f), the total consumed power will remain the same. Nevertheless, the
main issue will be because of the leakage power that grows exponentially that can
potentially cause major IR drop issues [26]. In other words, dynamic power grows
linearly with chip frequency (and since chip frequency used to be proportional to
scaling, power draw would scale linearly with device shrink) but leakage power is
increasing exponentially with device shrink.
Figure 2.4: A Temperature Distribution Map of a Typical Chip with a
Core and Cache [3]
IR drop is supply voltage drop across the chip. According to Ohms Law V=I
 R, where R is the equivalent path DC resistance between the source location
and the cell/macro location and I is the average current the chip draws from the
supply down the paths. The power grid or the power mesh is comprised of multi-
level metal structures. This includes planes, vias and tracks that feed the all of
the standard cells and the memories and the macros across the chip. The supply
voltage is produced by a voltage regulator module (VRM), which is usually a DC-
DC converter that is connected to the power grid and distributes power across the
chip.Chapter 2 Literature Review 13
Wire resistance can lead to excessive current draw from the power mesh that can
cause signicant performance degradations and signal integrity issues (an illus-
trated 2.5) . Due to smaller interconnect geometries the power mesh at UDSM
scales, the level of vulnerability to power supply non-uniformity and IR drop is
signicant. The manifestation of such issues will be more sensitivity to noise and
increased delay variation and eventually delay faults and timing errors. These
impacts are aggravated when there are gates with dierent supply voltage levels
that are connected across the chip communicating through level-shifters [4].
Figure 2.5: IR Drop in Power Distribution Network due to non-ideal com-
ponents [4] [5]
The eective amount of resistance through the path between the voltage regulator
module and the design blocks on the chip is the metric to estimate the IR drop.
It should be mentioned that the topic of IR drop is not limited to the design of
blocks on the chip. There are three main categories to be considered: On-chip IR
drop, Package IR drop, and Board-level IR drop. Because of UDSM dimensions,
accurate analysis of IR drop on the chip is critical as this is the most signicant
factor in determining if the chip is going to fail because of IR drop issues. However
recently package IR drop and board level IR drop have become more important
and their contribution to the over-all IR drop budget cannot be ignored [40]. This
is mainly because of decreased supply voltage and increase vulnerability to noise
issues that can have fatal impacts on the operation of high speed circuits. The
increase in temperature and the creation of hot-spot across the chip will also add
up to the IR drop that can potentially lead the chip towards failure [41].14 Chapter 2 Literature Review
2.2 Radiation and Soft Errors
The Earth and its surroundings are protected by the atmosphere, which acts as a
lter, to let throughout visible light and heat, while stopping a signicant amount
of radiation and Ultraviolet (UV) light. Because of this natural protection , human
beings and electronic devices are able to cope with solar ares, solar winds and
cosmic rays. As reported in NASA reference publications [42] and also in [6], the
two major sources of environment related spacecraft anomalies are, statistically,
plasma and radiation eects, i.e. eects related to the charged particles from the
space environment.
Figure 2.6: Spacecraft anomalies due to the space environment [6]
With technology scaling, radiation particle strikes are becoming increasingly prob-
lematic for both combinational circuits and memory elements even at sea level.
The rst report of serious industrial problem due to soft errors goes back to 1978
on the 2107-series 16-KB DRAMs by Intel. It was reported that the errors wereChapter 2 Literature Review 15
caused by the traces of radioactivity due to  particles in the package materials
which led to radiation-induced Single-Event-Upsets (SEU) at sea level, referred to
as \soft errors" [43]. From that era until now, radiation-induced problems have
been some of the most challenging reliability issues in circuits and systems, not
only in safety-critical applications and avionics, but also for Commercial, o-the-
shelf (COTS) products. Therefore, the circuits used in these application must be
tolerant to radiation particle strikes. In this section, we take a brief survey of
radiation-induced errors on circuits and systems.
2.2.1 Single Event Eects Denition
Soft errors are a subset of non-destructive Single-Event Eects (SEEs) [44]. The
interaction of nuclear particles with electronic components can create a series of
SEEs. Such eects can be categorized as hard eects and soft eects. Hard eects
or hard errors are permanent and non-recoverable. Soft errors are temporary
and might be recoverable by applying power shut down, reset or rewriting the
corrupted data. In CMOS-based circuits, the main hard error issues are Single
Event Burnout (SEB) that can occur in power MOS devices, SEGR or die-electric
breakdown caused by single event eects and micro-dose-induced threshold voltage
variations due to SEEs in CMOS transistors. The PNPN parasitic structures can
also be vulnerable. A Single Event Latch-up (SEL) can cause a strong current
which can lead to overheating of the device, that if it is not stopped by a power
cycle, it can have destructing impacts on the transistor. These hard errors are not
discussed in this thesis, but they represent the most signicant hard issues in the
topic of SEEs.
Multi-Cell Upset (MCU) will occur when one high energy particle hits many state
holding elements in a given clock cycle. On the other hand, Multi-Bit Upset
(MBU) occurs when more than one bit of a word is struck by a single particle.
There is another phenomenon known as Single Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI),
that can happen in more sophisticated circuits and systems. SEFIs can cause loss
of functionality because of perturbation of clocks or control registers that can lead
to long periods of malfunctions in the system. Recovery might be obtained by
switching o and back on, or rewriting conguration registers, or by applying a
reset [45].16 Chapter 2 Literature Review
2.2.2 Major Soft Error Problems
Silicon devices have become more susceptible to radiation and energetic particle
strikes. The energetic particle strikes can create localized ionization events in the
silicon devices and if this happens in the sensitive region on the CMOS device,
the resulting electron-hole pair can cause a transient current pulse that may alter
the logic state of the struck node as depicted in Fig.2.7 and Fig. 2.8. This is
known as a single event upset (SEU) on a memory element since it can upset the
storage elements; if the particles strike any combinational node they can cause a
transient current pulse that eventually becomes a voltage pulse at the output of
the struck node. It is known as a single event transient (SET) on a combinational
element [46] [47] [48] [49]. The transient pulse caused by a particle strike can be
captured by the sequential elements depending on the existence of an active path
from the struck node to the storage element, the arrival time and the width of the
transient pulse at the storage element input as shown in Fig. 2.9 [50] [51]. The
errors caused by SEUs or SETs are known as major soft error issues.
Figure 2.7: Illustration of single event transient pulse generation. Fun-
nelling in an n+/p silicon junction following the ion strike and the result-
ing electrical transient current caused by the passage of a high-energy ion
[7] [8].
As mentioned earlier, the transient pulse can be captured by a ip-op and cause
an error, provided that it is not masked by any of the following three derating
factors or masking phenomena:
￿ Logic Masking happens when the particle strikes either a non-controlling
input of a combinational logic gate, or the transient pulse is ltered out by
other controlling nodes on the path to a sequential element.
￿ Electrical Masking occurs for transient pulses which will be attenuated due
to characteristics of CMOS gates, such as size and load capacitance.Chapter 2 Literature Review 17
Figure 2.8: Particle strike on a sensitive node
Figure 2.9: SET in Combinational Logic
￿ Temporal Masking occurs when the transient pulse is either narrower than
the ip-op window of vulnerability or the transient pulse is wide enough
but reaches the memory element outside of the clock transition region and
hence it is not sensed and captured.
The main sources of Soft Errors are reported to be [52] [47] :
￿ Alpha particles (caused solely by silicon packaging and radioactive impuri-
ties)18 Chapter 2 Literature Review
￿ Neutron-induced ssion (interaction of neutrons from cosmic rays and boron
in the silicon packaging)
￿ High-energy cosmic rays
The physical eects of radiation-induced charges on devices and circuits can be
classied as: Direct and Indirect ionization. In direct ionization, as a high energy
particle passes through a semiconductor material, it generates electron-hole pairs.
As the radiation particle passes through the silicon, it loses its energy and after
expending all its energy, the particle will come to rest. To dene the transferred
energy from the particle, the linear energy transfer (LET) value is used. LET is
dened as the transferred energy that the radiation particle induced to generate
the electronhole pair per unit length, normalized by the density of the target
material (for VLSI designs, this is the density of Silicon) [31].
Indirect ionization consists of a light radiation particle with high energy that passes
through the semiconductor material. Such particle can have a collision with the
nucleus that can lead to a nuclear reaction. Protons and neutron particles are
good examples indirect ionization. Such phenomenon can also create secondary
particles such as heavy ions or alpha particles. Such secondary particle can then
go through a direct ionization process and if the charge gets placed in dierent
locations across the chip, multiple soft-errors can arise [31] [53].
Advances in packaging and fabrication have gradually reduced the eect of the
alpha-particle induced soft errors and the neutron-induced soft errors dominate
in most UDSM circuits [52]. Experimental results with heavy ions and alpha
particles indicate that SET pulse widths can range from about 100 ps to over
1 ns for the 90-nm process. Such pulse widths are comparable to valid logic
signals in 130nm and 90nm processes and indicate that as technology is scaled to
lower operating voltages and higher operating frequencies, SETs may become a
signicant reliability problem [54] [55] [56].
The soft-error rate (SER) is measured in FIT units (failures in time), where 1 FIT
denotes one failure per billion device hours (i.e., one failure per 114,077 years).
For electronic systems, usually the SER values range between a few hundreds
and around 100,000 FIT. This is about one soft error per year. The failure rate
induced by soft errors can be relatively high in electronic devices, compared to
other reliability issues that will be discussed later. The experimental results show
that the failure rate for hard errors (for example latch-ups) is approximately equal
to or lesser than 10 FIT. However, the soft-error rate is much higher. For instance,Chapter 2 Literature Review 19
the SER for an SRAM block with the size of 1 Mbit is usually of the order of 1,000
FIT in UDSM process technologies, which makes the memory blocks some of the
most vulnerable parts of the chip [57]. The situation becomes even worse for
systems with multiple memory blocks (which is the case for most of modern chips)
in a way that it exceeds the cumulative failure rates because of other reliability
issues. However, it should be noted the consequences of soft errors are totally
dierent from hard errors. In the case of soft errors, the fault usually disappears
when the system is reset or new data replaces the corrupted data, hence the
damage is not permanent.
As depicted in Fig. 2.10, in previous technologies, memory elements such as
SRAMs, ip-ops and latches contributed more to the overall SER of the chip and
the contributions of of combinatorial logic to the overall SER was much lower.
Therefore, memories (SRAMs, DRAMs, and latches) were mainly under consid-
eration as they were more vulnerable to radiation particle hits. However, as the
feature size of CMOS devices go below UDSM, the contribution of combinatorial
logic gates to the overall SER has take a much bigger share, while the contribution
of memory elements such as SRAMs to the overall SER has relatively remained
constant. The is due to the fact that by using deeply pipe-lined circuits, the lengths
of the combinatorial logic paths have been reduced dramatically which can result
in the reduction of the masking or derating factors. In other words, because fewer
number of SETs will get ltered out, the particle hits on combinatorial circuits
can cause more faults and aggravate the overall SER of the chip.
As the clock frequency increases, the probability that transient pulses will be cap-
tured as valid data in combinational logic increases linearly. Particularly in the
case of deeply pipe-lined processors, with an increase in circuit speeds, the chances
of a given transient pulse propagating through the combinatorial circuit and get-
ting latched increases, because the combination paths will become shorter and
there will be pipeline registers at every pipeline stage latching the data, hence
increasing the probability of an SET getting latched. However, we can also spec-
ulate that the duration of transient pulses decreases. Nevertheless due to both
their higher chances to propagate in high-speed circuits and their higher probabil-
ity of getting captured by the next stage state holding elements, such as ip-ops
and latches, SETs have been predicted to become a very critical issue in deep
Ultra-Deep Sub-Micron circuits [57].20 Chapter 2 Literature Review
Figure 2.10: SER of an alpha processor for dierent technology nodes [9]
2.3 The Reliability Issues
Semiconductor manufacturing continues to provide smaller feature sizes, resulting
in lower power, higher density, and lower cost per function. While this trend is pos-
itive, there are a number of negative side eects, including increased semiconductor
parameter variability, increased sensitivity to soft errors, and lower device yields
as mentioned before. The lifetime of the next-generation devices is also decreasing
due to lower reliability margins and shorter product lifetimes. As demonstrated
in [58], the average Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) of a modern-day super-scalar
processor has dropped by approximately 4X between the 180nm to 65nm technol-
ogy nodes. Design for reliability and resilience in the long term, is one of the major
challenges agged in the International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors
(ITRS) 2011 report [24].
Reliability is dened as the probability that a system or a device perform a specic
function up to a specic time interval, in a pre-dened environment. Dependability
can be dened as the ability of a system to deliver service at an acceptable level
of condence in either presence or absence of faults [20]. The metrics to calculate
the dependability of a system usually consist of the assessments of availability and
reliability, along with acceptable fault coverage and how the system meets the
safety requirements [59].Chapter 2 Literature Review 21
2.3.1 Major Reliability Issues in Ultra Deep-Sub-Micron
CMOS
Negative Bias Temperature Instability (NBTI), Hot-Carrier Injection (HCI) degra-
dation and Time-Dependent Dielectric Breakdown (TDDB) or "Wear-Out" of
MOS devices are some of the most important reliability concerns for UDSM de-
signs.
Figure 2.11: Hot carrier stress generates additional trap states near to the
drain
2.3.2 Negative Bias Temperature Instabilities (NBTI) &
Hot-Carrier Injection (HCI)
Negative bias temperature instability (NBTI) in pMOSFETs is considered a major
reliability issue in Ultra Deep-Sub-Micron analogue and digital integrated circuits
[60] [10]. This phenomenon occurs when a PMOS transistor is turned on at high
temperatures (usually between 100 ￿C and 150 ￿C). When the gate of a PMOS
transistor is negatively biased with respect to the substrate, defects are induced in
the device, resulting in permanently reduced drive current and threshold voltage
(Vth) shifts [10] [61].
In more details, the NBTI is caused the generation of traps at the Si   SiO2
interfaces due to electrical stress on PMOS transistors. The manifestation of
such electrical stress is reduction in channel mobility of the MOSFETs, through
an increase in threshold voltage or the induction of parasitic capacitances which22 Chapter 2 Literature Review
degrade the performance. This challenging issue that the chip industry is facing
can change the performance metrics of circuits and dramatically reduce the lifetime
of a chip over time. An interesting phenomenon is that the threshold voltage can
partially recover to its initial value when the gate bias is switched to 0V (interface
traps can be alleviated partially when the electrical stress is reduced). However
this Vth recovery is logarithmically time-dependent [10] [62]. As illustrated in [63]
[64] [10], a substantial recovery in Vth is observed when the electrical stress is
interrupted. This phenomenon is depicted in Fig 2.12 [65].
Figure 2.12: Vth dierences as a function of stress time, showing the
threshold voltage degradation during the stress and the partial-recovery
when the gate bias is switched to 0V. From [10].
NBTI recovery can have advantages and drawbacks. The advantage would be
in simpler circuits, in which the circuit can partially get closer to its nominal
performance when the stress is removed. However for complex systems, this may
backre. For instance, in circuits with a lot of power saving features, such as clock
gating, the clock-gated component do not age as much as the rest of the circuit,
which means, after the removal of the clock-gating, those specic component will
be faster than the rest of the circuit. This potentially can cause hold violations.
To explain NBTI, a hydrogen-release model is usually used. Under high tempera-
ture and applied voltage, the interface between the channel and the oxide will beChapter 2 Literature Review 23
hit by high energy holes. The result of this will be the breaking of silicon-hydrogen
bonds which will lead to the release of hydrogen atoms due to electrochemical re-
actions with the oxide interface. At the oxidechannel interface, positively charged
traps will be created due to the combination of free hydrogen atoms with nitrogen
or oxygen atoms. This leads to a shift in PMOS threshold voltage to become
more negative as a result of the reduction in holes mobility. Moreover these eects
impact the performance of the transistors by degrading the drive current of the
devices [19] [66].
Another principal degradation issue of MOSFETs is hot-electron-induced depas-
sivation, also known as HCI, of the Si   SiO2 interface that limits the operating
lifetime of the transistors [67]. Injection of hot-carriers can result in shifts in
threshold voltages and trans-conductance degradation in CMOS devices. This is
also caused by defects at the Si   SiO2 which has been mitigated for the current
generation of MOSFET devices. The manifestation of HCI is similar to NBTI i.e.
reducing the transistor performance and shifting devices metrics. The damage is
caused by hot carriers heating up in the high electric eld near the drain side of
the MOSFET that can lead to impact ionization and eventually degradation of
device parameters.
The reason that such carriers are called Hot Carriers is that they are highly en-
ergetic. The process of ionization at the drain, produces electron-hole pairs. The
substrate current Isub will increase when some of these hot carriers enter the sub-
strate region. Those carriers with high enough energy levels ( i.e. 3.1 eV or higher
for electrons and 4.6 eV or higher for holes) can potentially cross the oxide barrier
and enter the oxide and consequently cause defects [19].
The conventional method to measure HCI degradation is by measuring the drain
saturation current (IDsat) degradation. The reason is that IDsat is one of the key
transistor parameters that can be used to determine the HCI-induced impacts on
the circuit performance particularly because the HCI issues happen during the
normal operation of the circuit (i.e. when the circuit is active) while the transistor
is in saturation mode. A method to deal with HCI-induced issues is frequency
guard-banding as HCI is directly related to the activity of the devices.
The expected lifetime of a silicon chip is often between 5 and 15 years [25]. Usu-
ally, the frequency degradation during the expected lifetime is between 1% and
10% [19]. Therefore, usually the manufactured chips are margined a few percent
below the highest frequency at which they can actually operate. This frequency24 Chapter 2 Literature Review
marginalizing is known as the frequency guard-banding. Transistor lifetime degra-
dation due to HCI (for example a 3% reduction in the threshold voltage) is typically
speculated for the situation in which the chip is actually running (i.e. power on
mode) [25].
HCI used to be more important in NMOS devices historically. This is because of
the lower eective mass of electrons. Their mobilities are higher than holes and as a
result, they can obtain higher levels of energy from the electric eld in the channel
of the transistors. Also NBTI has a slower rate of degradation comparing to HCI.
It has been known that HCI usually happens in an NMOS device during the low to
high transition at the gate input, This also means high switching activity or higher
clock frequencies can increase HCI-induced ageing. Furthermore, the recovery in
HCI is so small that it is negligible, which makes HCI the worst in stresses under
AC conditions [68].
In any manufactured chip, the CMOS devices go through various stress conditions
at dierent times and every stress condition will have its own degradation im-
pacts on the devices. For instance, in a CMOS inverter, both the NMOS and the
PMOS devices are connected to the same input voltage. So for example, when the
input of the inverter gate is set to low ( 0V ), the PMOS transistor experiences
NBTI stress and therefore degrades while the NMOSFET is shut down. When
the input transition from low (0v) to high (VDD), the NMOSFET goes through
impact ionization condition and HCI degradation occurs. At the same time, the
PMOS transistor is shut down and some of the NBTI-induced impacts can alle-
viate [68]. Due to the fact that each degradation mechanism (NBTI, HCI, also
depends on signal transitions) generates defects either in the bulk oxide or at the
interface, the overall MOSFET degradation can get very complex and modelling
such phenomenon accurately is a challenge.
2.3.3 Time-Dependent Dielectric Breakdown (TDDB) or
"Wear-Out"
The continued scaling of MOSFET devices requires ultra-thin gate dielectrics for
controlling the short channel eect. This has reduced the reliability of the dielectric
layer leading to dielectric breakdown over time due to the formation of a conductive
path through the oxide to the substrate [69]. Even though TDDB has been studied
for over three decades, the exact physical mechanism remains unclear. What is
known is that the process is driven by voltage and temperature [10]. Major studiesChapter 2 Literature Review 25
have shown that electron uence (current) and energy (voltage) are the driving
factors for wearing out and eventual breakdown [10]. Oxide break down can be
categorized into hard break down (HBD) and soft break down (SBD); HBD is
considered as a catastrophic failure of the device and hence the entire circuit while
SBD events do not cause immediate failure of the CMOS device but will aect the
performance of the circuit [70]. Typically after soft breakdown the leakage current
is only slightly larger than the pre-stress tunnelling characteristic. After some time
the leakage current can continue to increase, nally resulting in a hard breakdown.
To limit the thermal damages of TDDB, the power dissipation needs to be reduced.
To do so, either the supply voltage needs to reduced or the percolation path current
needs to be decreased by the application of resistance in series.
NMOS in inversion used to be the major factor of TDDB-induced lifetime degra-
dations in previous technologies. But as reported by Intel in [11], in their 45nm
CMOS technology, TDDB can occur on NMOS and PMOS under all operating
bias conditions. During normal device operation, the electric eld across the gate
dielectric causes the generation of electrical defects which are known as "traps".
The local electric eld can then be impacted by such traps and leakage current can
increase in the dielectric to a point where a conductive "chain" is formed between
the cathode and the anode as depicted in Fig. 2.13.
The statistical theory that describes this process is called the Percolation Theory
[71]. The percolation assumes that the traps are generated inside the oxide at
random locations. At the vicinity of these traps, a sphere is considered with a
constant radius 'r', and conduction happens when the sphere of two random traps
overlap as depicted in Fig. 2.13. In the case of UDSM devices, the dielectric
thickness is getting thinner (1.2nm in 65 nm technology consists of only a few
monolayers of SI-O bonds), resulting in more susceptibility to gate current leakage
and eventually leading to TDDB [72].
Although there is contradictory consensus in the literature on the exact physical
mechanisms that lead to gate dielectric breakdown. It is generally accepted that
a combination of several mechanisms such as trap-assisted conduction, charge
injection, as well as bulk trap state generation contribute to TDDB. Through the
constant presence of stress, more trap states are created and, eventually, there will
be a gradual increase in the gate current. This phenomenon is known as Stress
Induced Leakage Current (SILC) degradation [72] [11].
In summary, the impacts of technology scaling on CMOS circuits and devices man-
ifest themselves as process variation leading to performance/power issues, more26 Chapter 2 Literature Review
Figure 2.13: Percolation Theory describes traps as spheres of radius "r.
When several of them form a complete chain from anode to cathode, break-
down (BD) occurs. The thinner the dielectric, the fewer the traps needed
to cause Break down [11].
vulnerability to soft errors and causing severe reliability issues such as HCI/NBI
and oxide break down. Simultaneous interactions of all of the aforementioned
reliability issues, calls for a challenging comprehensive solution to deal with all
of them. In the next section of this chapter, we take a brief survey of proposed
techniques to cope with UDSM impacts on design.Chapter 2 Literature Review 27
2.4 Solutions and state-of-the-art
In the previous section, we took a brief survey of major challenges in UDSM
CMOS devices. In this part we review the main techniques for the analysis and
the mitigation of UDSM impacts on circuits. First, the Pre-Silicon techniques
or static techniques that are applicable at design time are discussed. Next Post-
Silicon or dynamic techniques that are based on adaptability and are applicable
at Run-Time, are discussed.
2.4.1 Tackling Variations At Design-Time
2.4.1.1 Analysis Techniques
Traditionally, circuit performance is measured by deterministic timing analysis
and by considering the path with the maximum delay or the worst-case or critical
path. But in UDSM systems any path in a particular chip, can potentially become
critical, depending on how variations manifest themselves on that particular chip.
This phenomenon results in a circuit whose operation may be logically correct but
does not perform at the required operating voltage and frequency [38] [73] [74].
The probabilistic nature of the timing behaviour of UDSM systems strongly sug-
gests that statistical analysis and simulation should play a role in the selection
and testing of critical paths. In statistical timing analysis, the propagation delays
are modeled as random variables with given probability density functions (pdfs).
By providing the gate-level netlist, design constraints, required clock frequency,
the probability density functions of the cells from pin-to-pin and the interconnect
delays, one would need to calculate the PDF of the actual signal arrival times,
the required time and the slacks of primary outputs and the internal signals. Us-
ing all this data, we can compute the delay of the longest paths for setup timing
checks, the shortest paths for hold timing tests and conclusively the determine the
probable maximum speed of the design [75].
Statistical Timing Analysis Techniques
The eld of Statistical Timing Analysis has been an active area of research and
thus the literature is full of solid approaches that in many ways are built on each
other; where each new approach vies to improve on a limitation or a short-coming
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At transistor level, there are diverse models and methods for statistical analysis
and optimization Such as Monte Carlo, Response Surface Methodology (RSM),
Principal Component Analysis (PCA), Projection-based performance modelling
(PROBE) and Asymptotic Probability Extraction (APEX) methods [76].
Due to the huge size of the circuits and the complexity of computations in terms of
number of transistors and random variables, it is not feasible to model and analyze
variations for every single gate on a chip. Therefore analysis at higher abstraction
levels is also performed.





These methods are based on performing timing analysis on a selected set of critical
paths in a circuit. Generally path-based methods are inecient at UDSM scales,
due to the uncertainty that exists in critical path selection.
Block-Based Methods
Block-Based Methods are similar to timing graph traversal which is preformed in
traditional Static Timing Analysis (STA). But instead of pre-determined or nom-
inal delays for each node, delay distributions are propagated through the timing
graph. The advantage of this method in comparison with path-based methods is
that there is no need for critical path selection. However due to the usage of delay
distributions, the computational complexities of these methods are noteworthy.
Traditional Block-Based STA Methods are based on two atomic operations: SUM()
and MAX() as depicted in Fig. 2.14. In a timing graph in which each node
represents a logic gate, the value of SUM() for the node(j) is the sum of the Arrival
Time(AT) from the previously traversed node (i) and the propagation delay from
previous node (i) to current node(j). The Value of MAX() is the maximum Arrival
Time(AT) of all the incoming paths to the current node(i). These two operations
are repetitively executed to traverse the whole timing graph from the source node
to the sink node.Chapter 2 Literature Review 29
Figure 2.14: SUM and MAX Operations
Note that for statistical block-based timing analysis, SUM() and MAX() oper-
ations must calculate probability distributions instead of nominal deterministic
values. Most of the techniques proposed in the literature are based on the as-
sumption that variations are Normally Distributed. However, in practice, this is
not proven.
In [77] and [78], algorithms are propose which are capable of calculating SUM() and
MAX() by estimating PDF/CDF of either Normal or Non-Normal Distributions
of arrival times, provided that all the distributions are mutually independent. But
in practice, correlations exist; for instance, the arrival times can be correlated
due to shared-paths or correlated process variations that results in joint or even
multi-dimensional PDF/CDF which are computationally expensive to perform.
In [74] a variation-aware method based on statistical timing to select critical paths
is introduced, in which node criticalities are computed to determine the probabil-
ities of dierent circuit nodes being on the critical path across process variation.
This methodology is aimed at uncovering performance violations in defect-free in-
tegrated circuits, however at nano-scale, physical defects are more likely to happen
due to the fact that IC manufacturing process is inherently imperfect.
2.4.1.2 Implementation Techniques
At the architectural level, we can maintain the performance of the circuit and keep
the supply voltage as low as possible (which is the ultimate goal in being power
and energy ecient), by using parallel architectures also known as pipe-lining. As
discussed in [79], this can be done by using parallelized circuits in a way that a
bigger function will be broken into smaller functions, and each small function will
be assigned to one of the parallelized circuits. By doing this the clock frequency
requirements can be relaxed per parallelized circuits, provided that we can meet
the target latency [80].30 Chapter 2 Literature Review
Gosh et al. [81] [82] proposed a pipeline-based design paradigm to achieve ro-
bustness with respect to timing failure and provide an opportunity for aggressive
voltage scaling by critical path isolation. In their methodology called CRISTA, a
set of possible paths that may become critical under process variations are pre-
dicted and isolated by increasing timing slack between critical and non-critical
parts and their rare activation is ensured and afterwards any possible delay failure
in the critical paths is avoided by dynamically changing to two-cycle operation
using clock stretching (assuming all standard operations are single cycle). The
drawback is that it is not generic and can be utilized only for pipeline designs
considering single cycle operations.
Kourtev et al. [12] used clock skew scheduling techniques to decrease the number
of paths with the maximum delay. They used clock scheduling (i.e. applying non-
zero clock skews) to increase or decrease the amount of path delays. By applying
this technique, a "shift" of the path delay distribution away from the maximum
path delay can be achieved as depicted in Fig.2.15. There are two benecial eects
of that shift of delay which are either the circuit can be run at a lower clock period
(or higher clock frequency) or the circuit can operate at the target clock period
with a reduced probability of setup and hold time violations (improving the overall
system reliability). However, this technique requires careful modication of clock
distribution network to adjust desirable delays for each clocked-element at design
time, but due to variations, the design-time properties and adjustments of the
clock network may not be preserved after manufacturing.
Most of the techniques mentioned above are aimed at modelling, predicting, opti-
mizing and accommodating power and performance issues caused by variations at
pre-silicon stage or at design-time. On the other hand, there is another paradigm
that addresses variation issues at post-silicon stage or run-time. These techniques
are based on the idea of adaptive or tunable systems. In the next part, we will
review these techniques.
2.4.2 Tackling Variations At Run-time
To facilitate low power, high performance, high yield products which are based on
less reliable UDSM devices, post silicon or run-time techniques are introduced and
applied for variety of applications. Here the main idea is instead of over-designing
and over-calculation and simulations to cover all the variations, device parameters
such as supply voltage or Body bias voltage are set based on the information suchChapter 2 Literature Review 31
Figure 2.15: The application of clock skew scheduling to a commercial
integrated circuit with 6,890 registers (note that the time scale is in fem-
toseconds) [12]
as voltage, leakage or delay measurements for each device. In more sophisticated
techniques even logic functions can be moved to other processing elements on the
device to meet the performance requirements.32 Chapter 2 Literature Review
2.4.2.1 Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling (DVFS)
Recalling from the equations Eq. 2.1 and Eq. 2.2, it is obvious that to improve
the delay of a given standard cell (i.e. reducing tpLH and tpHL ), one could in-
crease supply voltage (Vdd), reduce threshold voltage (Vth), increase transistor's












n(V DD   jVtnj)2 (2.2)
Among these, the most feasible parameters for tuning are supply and threshold
voltages and most of the adaptive/dynamic techniques are based on tuning these
parameters. Threshold voltage can be changed by body biasing. If the body-
source junction is reverse biased (Vbody<0 for NMOS, Vbody>VCC for PMOS),
the magnitude of the threshold voltage increases. If the body-source junction is
forward biased (Vbody>0 for NMOS, Vbody<VCC for PMOS), the magnitude of the
threshold voltage reduces.
There is always a back-and-forth relationship between Vdd and Vth in DVFS. Low
Vth leads to higher leakage power and lower dynamic power. With lower Vth, the
target clock frequency can be met at lower Vdd while the leakage power will be
higher. By [13] [83].
As the threshold voltage is increased, the supply voltage required to maintain the
operating frequency is also increased and hence dynamic power increases. At the
same time, the increasing threshold voltage results in a lower leakage power. For a
given integrated circuit, there is an optimum point where the power is minimized
as depicted in gure 2.16. This is the point where the increase in dynamic power
is oset by the decrease in leakage power [13] [83].
An important voltage scaling technique is designing circuits with multiple supply
voltages. Traditionally, synchronous chips are designed to work using a single
voltage supply. Owing to the fact that the number of timing critical paths in a
chip is usually a small portion of all of the paths, most of the paths can actually
operate with lower voltages. In other words, most of the paths in a circuit, have
wide positive setup timing slacks. So they usually arrive much earlier to the
downstream logic comparing to critical paths and they have to wait until the dataChapter 2 Literature Review 33
Figure 2.16: Dynamic and sub-threshold leakage power components for a
xed operating frequency in 140nm. As VDD increases, Vbody is adjusted
to maintain the operating speed [13].
and the signals of the critical paths have also arrived and are valid. For such non-
critical paths, although they are fast, but they cannot increase the performance
of the circuit as the circuit speed is limited by the speed of the critical paths.
Therefore, by operating such non-critical paths at lower voltages (up to the point
that they will not become too slow to result in more critical paths), we can save
energy.
By selectively decreasing the supply voltage for the gates or blocks which are not on
recognised critical paths, and simultaneously maintaining or increasing the supply
voltage for the gates on the critical paths we can meet the target clock frequency
while optimizing power consumption, hence saving energy [80]. The problem is
that scaling the supply voltage of all of the gates along a non-critical delay path,
may not always be feasible due to local timing constraints. Moreover specialized
voltage-level converter circuits are required to interface the circuits operating at
dierent supply voltages in a multiple supply voltage circuit that will add overhead
to the circuit.
Among the multiple supply voltage techniques, the clustered voltage scaling (CVS)
technique, proposed in [80] [84], minimizes the number of voltage-level converters
in a multiple supply voltage circuit. In the CVS technique, the supply voltages are
assigned such that no low supply voltage gate drives a high supply voltage gate.
This technique is applicable at gate-level; however impacts of DSM on critical34 Chapter 2 Literature Review
paths selection and delay uncertainties are not observable at gate-level, therefore
the eciency of this technique at UDSM is dubious.
Static leakage power can also be reduced using multi-threshold techniques along
with power gating techniques and by scaling up the threshold voltage and scaling
down the supply voltage. To disconnect power supply - VDD or VSS rails - from
the blocks that are in idle mode, power-gating switches (transistors with high
Vth) can be used [39]. The drawback here is that this technique is only appli-
cable when the targeted circuit parts are idle for a considerable number of clock
cycles. Also it should be noted that disconnecting power rails results in loss of
data unless some memory elements are added to the circuits to save the states
which adds to the overheads. Moreover, from a design perspective, this technique
cannot be automatically added at gate-level and information and signals from the
architectural-level are required to make the idle mode entrance or exiting decisions.
Another useful technique to deal with delays is frequency scaling (i.e. adjusting
the global frequency and also adjusting the local clock frequency of the blocks on
a chip). The optimal performance and delay tolerance might be achieved using a
combination of supply/threshold voltage scaling and frequency scaling.
Tschanz et al. [65] explore schemes to dynamically adapt various combinations
of frequency, supply and body bias to changes in temperature, supply noises, and
transistor aging, to maximize average performance or improve energy eciency.
Their clocking scheme is comprised of three PLLs which operate on dierent fre-
quencies and they are independent of one another. The scheme also includes a
multiplexer to choose the appropriate clock source from these three PLLs. Vari-
ous algorithms have been proposed on how and when to switch among the clock
sources. In one simple method, the clock controller chooses one of the indepen-
dently running PLLs and in a more complex method, PLL frequencies are chosen
in a way that the circuit is running on one PLL, while one of the other two PLLs is
locked to a lower frequency and the other one is locked to a higher frequency taking
the currently under use PLL as the reference frequency. In the case of switching
to one of the lower/higher frequency PLLs, the other two PLLs will re-lock to
the 'new' lower and higher PLLs and this 3-stage procedure will be repeated at
run-time continuously. However, the penalty with these on-line frequency scaling
techniques is the PLL re-lock time due to PLL reconguration procedure, espe-
cially when PLL supply voltage and core circuit supply voltage are shared and
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Among various adaptive and dynamic voltage and frequency scaling techniques,
Pass-Fail techniques are more pragmatic. Pass-Fail techniques scale the param-
eters until the system reaches the point of failure and then tune them to avoid
timing errors. This signicantly increases performance and reduce power consump-
tion [13] but the problem is that adjusting these parameters is not instantaneous
and may take multiple clock cycles.
On the other hand, although adaptive and dynamic techniques are benecial in
dealing with variations at run-time, yet their eectiveness is bounded by the well-
known "Worst-Case" conditions or design margins. While these worst case con-
ditions give a high level of condence, in reality the worst case conditions seldom
occur, and if a system is capable of detecting and correcting the errors on the
occurrence of such worst case conditions, then more aggressive scaling can be ap-
plied. In other words, the design margins can be reduced and instead of worst case
conditions, system can be design based on "Better-Than-Worst-Case (BTWC)"
conditions rather than "Worst Case" with more relaxed design margins [85] [86].
The BTWC approach is generic and can be applied at dierent abstraction levels
of the design. At circuit and architectural level an approach called Razor [14]
has been proposed which is based on dynamic detection and correction of circuit
timing errors. The key idea behind Razor is to automatically adapt the supply
voltage based on the feedback we get from the timing error rate. This happens
at run time, so there is a specic mechanism to monitor the timing errors. In
theory, Razor-style architectures, can dramatically relax design-time margining
and timing constraints.
In Razor ip-op as shown in Fig. 2.17, the logic values at the down stream logic
are sampled twice in every clock cycle. The rst sample (main ip-op) is taken
using the very fast clock frequency (the normal operating speed) and the second
sample (shadow ip-ip or latch) is taken using a delayed clock. A comparator
compares the values of the main ip-op and the shadow latch. When there is a
timing error, the values of the main ip-op and the shadow latch do not match.
This will ag an error and consequently the pipeline will be ushed from that
stage and the failed instruction will be redone [13] [14]. Here, the assumption
is that during normal operation, the delay and power overhead caused by the
error detection and correction phase is minimal, otherwise the power-performance
eciency of this method is not signicant. Moreover, no shadow ip-op should
be placed on \short paths" as this may cause the shadow ip-op to catch the36 Chapter 2 Literature Review
next data wave. In other words, checking the set-up and hold-time constraints
becomes more complicated.
Figure 2.17: Razor Architecture [14]
At algorithmic level, Digital Signal Processors are good candidates for system
design with reduced design margins. These techniques are known as Algorithmic
Noise Tolerance (ANT). An example of ANT is shown in Fig. 2.18. In such
systems an estimator (which is much simpler than the main processing block)
that approximates the outcome of the complex computation can be added to the
system and operates in parallel with the main computation block [15].
Figure 2.18: ANT Architecture [15]
In this case, assume that the main block parameters such as supply voltage have
been aggressively scaled (with respect to the BTWC concept), so errors may start
to occur and the main block faces values far from the predictions produced by
the estimator. Therefore an error condition is agged (detection), upon which
the faulty outcome is replaced by the estimation (correction). This obviously
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(SNR), but if the estimator is good enough, the increase in the noise level is
masked by the noise of the input signal or by the added noise of the signal-
processing algorithm, and hence barely matters. Also it must be mentioned that
\small errors" (errors that only eect the least-signicant bits [LSBs]) may go
undetected. For this scheme to work, clearly it is essential that the estimator does
not make any errors itself. This requires that the \Estimate Module" be run at the
nominal voltage. Since it is supposed to be a simple function, its energy overhead
is small [15].
Based on this idea, an architecture for motion estimation is proposed in [87] which
over scales the supply voltage at the expense of timing errors which are then cor-
rected using the technique mentioned above. The main block in this architecture
uses the MSAD (main sum of absolute dierences) algorithm, whereas the estima-
tor uses a simpler version called ISR-SAD (Input sub-sampled replica of sum of
absolute dierences) with reduced precision and reduced sampling rate compared
to the MSAD. However, utilizing this technique, it is obvious that the estimator
must not make any error by itself which necessitates that the estimator block must
work at nominal voltage.
Figure 2.19: An example result of Motion Estimation with ANT error
correction [15]
In [88], a Variation-Aware DVFS scheme is proposed for chip-multiprocessors.
Chips are divided into Voltage/Frequency islands and two dierent hardware con-
trollers considered for applying DVFS, the simple threshold-based controller and a
greedy controller; The latter has higher overhead and higher power reduction capa-
bility. In this scheme, rst the intra-die variation is calculated as a single eective
parameter and feed to the system at the test time to determine the proper operat-
ing point to minimize power/throughput and choose the right voltage/frequency
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2.4.2.2 Considerations
Despite the fact that dynamic voltage and frequency scaling techniques generally
oer quadratic reduction in power while maintaining the performance until re-
cently, at UDSM scales, these techniques have not been as as fruitful and practical
as before. For instance, The Adaptive Body Biasing (ABB) technique for below
65-nm technologies are not eective at all as illustrated in Fig. 2.20.
Figure 2.20: Comparison of body bias eectiveness in three technolo-
gies [15]
As it is shown, for 65 nm technologies, the broad body-biasing of 1-volt range,
gives a narrow range of 55 mV for the threshold voltage and this will be even
worse for 45nm or below.
Moreover, as predicted in ITRS reports, the next generation of circuits and power
supplies (2007-2014) must operate at 0.9 V to 0.6 V with a dynamic range of 0.2
to 0.3 V. This level of voltage scaling denotes more susceptibility to noise and
transient errors which result in more unreliability in the circuits. Therefore more
power and area overhead may be required for error detection and correction which
may overcome the power-performance savings using DVFS techniques [89] [90].Chapter 2 Literature Review 39
2.4.3 Soft Error Mitigation Techniques: Radiation Hard-
ening By Design (RHBD)
Soft errors used to be primarily an issue for space and avionics applications but
for UDSM technologies, it has also become a reliability problem at sea level. This
has resulted in increased SEUs in state holding cells such as latches, and ip-ops
caused by cosmic neutrons and alpha particles. Also, combinatorial logic is not
more immune to radiation eects anymore and the number of particle-induced
SETs in logic has been increased, leading to more SETS getting captured by the
downstream ip-ops and latches.
The usual mechanism to overcome the soft error issues in memories has been the
utilization of Error Correcting Codes (ECC) which imposes rather moderate over-
heads in terms of performance, area and power. This overhead penalty is tolerable
is some designs and not acceptable in performance/area critical designs. Depend-
ing on the application of the design and also the design size, ECC techniques might
be too costly and not feasible. In sequential cells and the logic, duplication, tripli-
cation, comparing and majority voting are some of the most well known techniques
to overcome SEUs and SETs. However such techniques bring their own expensive
performance, area and power overheads, making such techniques not suitable for
all applications.
As stated earlier in this chapter, logic is aected by SEU and SET related soft
errors. SEUs occur when an ionizing particle striking a sensitive node of a ip-op
or a latch cell ips the state of the cell. SET-related soft errors occur when a
transient pulse, initiated by an ionizing particle striking a sensitive node of a logic
gate, is propagated through the gates of the combinatorial logic and is captured
by a sequential element such as a latch or a ip-op.
Although SEUs are the most signicant contributors to logic SER, SETs cannot be
ignored as we move towards higher density chips. SETs will be discussed in chapter
3. If the logic SER of a given design exceeds the maximum allowable FIT due to
SEUs, state-holding elements such as ip-ops or latches need to be protected to
obtain an acceptable FIT gure. This can be achieved by replacing a selected
group of conventional ip-ops and latches with hardened ones. However if such
techniques are not sucient to meet the required FIT gure (for example because
of emerging SETs), then more comprehensive and perhaps sophisticated soft-error
mitigation mechanisms must be utilized to make sure the circuit is resilient to SEUs
and SETs. Such approach can be based on Hardware and Software using means40 Chapter 2 Literature Review
of redundancy. This can be time (temporal) redundancy or space redundancy or
even a combination of both.
2.4.3.1 RHBD at device/Layout Level
At device/layout level, the simplest solution is increasing the charge needed for
an SEU to occur which is known as the \critical charge". This can be achieved
by increasing the capacitance in the sensitive nodes. The bigger the capacitance,
the higher the immunity to SEUs with the drawback of imposing more power
and area overhead [91]. In [16] [17], Enclosed Layout Transistors (ELT) has been
proposed to eliminate the radiation-induced current between source and drain,
hence avoiding the upset to happen as shows in Fig. 2.21 and Fig. 2.22. In these
transistors the SEEs caused by radiation hits are prevented by cutting the current
between the drain and the source of the transistor. This has been demonstrated
to be very eective in CMOS processes of dierent technology nodes. However,
due to challenges such as modelling the ELT transistors to compute W/L, the
limitation in the W/L ratio that can be achieved and the lack of symmetry in the
device, very few such radiation hardened cell libraries exist.
Figure 2.21: Top view of an open-layout NMOS transistor (left), and along
its A-B line (right, view from the source or the drain electrode to the
transistor channel) [16] [17]
In Fig. 2.21, the electric eld is marked by the dashed line across the oxide of
the STI at the transistor edge. This is the area where the STI and the polysilicon
gate overlap each other. The + symbol, shows the positive charge that is caused
by particle hits and is trapped in the STI. This trapped charge will improve the
electric eld up until the time that the P-doped inversion happens at the edges
which will lead to opening two parasitic channels through which leakage current
can ow from source to drain. In Fig. 2.22, the ends of the active areas and the
beginning of the STI areas are shown by solid lines. Note that, n+ doping willChapter 2 Literature Review 41
Figure 2.22: Transistor layout view for some of the possible NMOS de-
signs eliminating the radiation-induced leakage current between source and
drain [16] [17]
not be applied to the active area under the gate however this area is covered by a
thin gate oxide that also covers the surroundings of both the drain and the source.
This thin oxide layer is radiation tolerant [92].
This has been demonstrated to be very eective in CMOS processes of dierent
technology nodes. However, there is a lot of challenges in the way of using such
layouts. For instance, the limitations in modelling the ELT transistors and com-
puting the W-L ratios and the inherent asymmetry in such devices, make it very
dicult and expensive to be built for commercial applications. Hence there are
not many of such hardened cells in existence.
2.4.3.2 RHBD at Transistor Level
Most of the proposed techniques at transistor level and above are based on various
redundancies. The main feature of hardened storage cells (SRAM cells, latches,
and ip-ops) is their capability in keeping their states when one of their inter-
nal nodes gets hit by a radiation particle that changes the state of that internal
node. Various hardened storage cells have been proposed in the literature. We
can categorize them in to three main types of hardened state holding cells [18].42 Chapter 2 Literature Review
The rst type is based on increasing the critical charge by the addition of capac-
itors and/or resistors on the feedback loop of the state holding element. Passive
elements such as poly-silicon can be utilized to create resistors in such cells. By
using this technique, very strong resistors can be made at very low area overheads.
To increase the coupling capacitance can be done by using DRAM-style stacked
capacitors which are placed on top of the state holding element. This will not
incur any considerable area overheads [92]. The drawback of the above hardening
approaches is that they require extra process steps that can have an impact on
fabrication cost. In addition to the cost issue, such techniques may also have an
impact on cell speed and power. These issues may reduce the interest of the above
approaches for some commercial applications.
In the second category of designing hardened state holding, extra transistors are
used. The radiation immunity of such cells are based on particular transistor
sizing. The main challenge of using such cells is that while technology is going
below UDSM scales, because of the the transistor sizing limits, the scaling of these
do not track well with technology scaling. Also the addition of extra transistors
will add to the area overheads.
The third and the last category of such hardened cells are Dual Interlock Cells also
known as DICE as shown in Fig. 2.23. In such cells, radiation immunity to SEUs
is obtained by duplication of the internal state holding nodes in the cell structure
[93] [94]. The advantage of DICE is in its low performance penalty and the draw
back is in its power and area overheads that can be twice the amount of a regular
state holding cell. However since no specic scaling is needed for DICE cells, they
are an attractive option for SEU hardening of UDSM technologies. Also Heavy
Ion Tolerant (HIT) [95] cells t in this category, in which the state-holding notes
are duplicated to avoid the upsets. However for 90nm technologies and below,
the SEU immunity achieved by these techniques is reported to be only 10 times
better than standard cells. Moreover a particle strike on one of the state-holding
nodes can cause the cell output to be wrong temporarily that can be fatal if it
propagates to the next logic stage [18].
Also at transistor-level, techniques such as Code Word State Preserving (CWSP)
have been proposed [18] [57]. Code Word State Preserving (CWSP) is based on
replacing each transistor by a pair of transistors connected in series and driven by
duplicated inputs. A CWSP cell, compares the values at its two inputs. When
they are identical, the output value will be updated based on the input values.Chapter 2 Literature Review 43
Figure 2.23: A hardened store holding cell - DICE [18]
Otherwise, when the inputs are not the same, the output value of the gate will be
preserved. An example of such CWSP gates are depicted in Fig. 2.24.
Figure 2.24: Code Word State Preserving (CWSP)44 Chapter 2 Literature Review
Figure 2.25: Dual Interlock Cell (DICE)
2.4.3.3 RHBD at Gate Level
Soft error mitigating techniques at gate level and higher levels of abstractions,
are usually based on some sort of spatial redundancy, temporal redundancy or a
combination of both. Among all of the proposed techniques at gate level, TMR is
the most eective one and has been used extensively in the industry. At gate level,
usually all the sequential elements in the design are triplicated with a majority
voting circuit at the end. This imposes 3.2X overhead in terms of area and power
compared to a non-TMR sequential cell. It is noteworthy to mention that the TMR
concepts are also applicable at system level in which the whole core (sequential
cells and combinational blocks) are triplicated as shown in Fig. 2.26; however
again this adds more than 200% overhead to the whole area and power at system
level. Fault tolerant techniques based on majority voting have fairly high fault
coverage. In these systems, the output of the system is decided based on a voting
mechanism among the sub-systems. However NMR (N Modular Redundancy)
systems cannot necessarily handle all of the multiple-fault scenarios. For example
a TMR system will fail if two sub-systems out of three are faulty at the same time.
2.4.3.4 RHBD at Register Transfer Level
The concept of TMR can be applied at Register Transfer Level (RTL) too. In [96],
a method for an automatic insertion of radiation-hardened modules in designs
at RTL is described. In their approach the VHDL RTL code is taken and the
desired replicated blocks are added to design along with the required auxiliaryChapter 2 Literature Review 45
Figure 2.26: Triple modular redundancy
signals. This is done in two steps: 1) Target selection and replication, 2)Resolution
function. However there is no commercial automatic RHBD at RTL tool available.
In [97], an SEU error correction method is proposed in which the data-paths are
duplicated and the outputs of every stage are monitored continuously. In the case
of a mismatch at each stage, second computation is triggered on one of the two
data path while the other data path continues processing the next input. Here
the assumption is that neither of the computations requires error monitoring due
to the probability of SEU occurrence on two consecutive iterations.
Another conventional technique is stand-by redundancy. In this technique, a di-
agnostic mechanism checks the outputs of the replicated sub-systems as shown in
Fig.2.27. The fault coverage of this technique is the key element and the reliability
of such a system is as good as its diagnostic mechanism. Any failure to detect
faults, can lead to the system failure as the wrong output can be chosen. Stand-
by redundancy systems are more suitable for environments in which permanent
faults and multiple faults are the major concerns. Since detecting transient faults
needs an on-the-y and at-speed fault detection mechanism, stand-by redundancy
systems are not very suitable for detecting and recovering from transient faults
[98].
2.4.3.5 RHBD at Software Level
In the case that RHBD techniques are not applicable on hardware (because of
architectural or technological limitations), software level is an interesting option.
Various approaches have been proposed at software level like Computation Dupli-
cation [99], Procedure-level Duplication [100], Program-level Duplication [101] and46 Chapter 2 Literature Review
Figure 2.27: Stand-by redundancy
Redundant Multi-Threading (RMT) [102] [103]. In all of these approaches, the
error detection & correction capabilities are obtained by virtually adding the Dual
Modular Redundancy (DMR) or TMR schemes at dierent levels of granularity:
instruction, instructions block, procedure, program, etc.
Applying RHBD techniques at each level of abstraction has its own advantages and
drawbacks. There is a trade-o between the overhead and eciency, and usually
RHBD at higher levels of abstraction adds to the complexity of such techniques.
Among all, Radiation Hardening at gate-level is the simplest and one of the most
eective one, which is also supported by conventional EDA tools.
2.4.4 Dealing with the Reliability issues
A fundamental challenge in designing reliable systems is estimating whether a
system will function properly in a predened manner in a given environment for a
given period of time. Providing this level of reliability of electronic systems out of
intrinsically unreliable UDSM CMOS components is a major challenge [104]. For
instance, Reliability requirements for computer systems that are used in military
aircrafts, are typically in the range of 1 - 10 7 per mission, and the reliability
requirements of 1 - 10 9 for a ten-hour ight are often expressed for mission-
critical avionics systems [105].Chapter 2 Literature Review 47
Computer systems are designed to detect faults and be able to tolerate such faults
by themselves. However this fault resilience is not 100% guaranteed and such
systems are still vulnerable to failure. Therefore their reliability must be examined
and we need to make sure that the fault tolerance requirement targets are met.
One issue is the complexity of analyzing and modelling the actual reliability of such
fault-tolerant systems. Usually lifetime test is used as a measure of reliability. To
determine the reliability of a highly-reliable design the following steps are taken:
1. Develop a mathematical model of the reliability of such system
2. Measure or approximate the parameters of the reliability model at elevated
temperatures
3. Calculate the system reliability using the developed model and the specied
model parameters
Obviously the precision of the estimated reliability of a given system solely depends
on the accuracy of the model that has been used. Also due to the complexities of a
highly fault-tolerant systems, deriving an accurate model that can comprehensively
describe the behavior the system is a Herculean task. Such models should precisely
consider all of the phases and the processes that lead to system failures along with
the capabilities of the fault-tolerant system to operate in the presence of the faults
and the broken parts.
Inherently the implementation of any fault-tolerance mechanism involves imposing
additional overheads. In such mechanisms, redundancy has to be incorporated into
the system with the aim of masking the faults. This will denitely increase both
the cost and the development time. Moreover, any redundancy mechanism will
impose some overheads in terms of power, performance, area on the system. Hence,
there will always be a trade o between a suitable fault-tolerant technique and its
inevitable overhead versus the fault coverage and the power, performance, area
budget of the system. In other words, in the cost-benet framework of a good
fault-tolerant system, benets - i.e. fault-tolerance and error recovery - should
outweigh the costs which are the overheads and downtime of the system.
Hardware redundancy is perhaps the most commonly used method and can be
employed in various forms. The two major forms are: Static redundancy in which
fault-tolerance is achieved without actually detecting any faults. In Dynamic48 Chapter 2 Literature Review
redundancy such as \stand-by redundancy", a fault detection mechanism is built-
in to the system which makes the system capable of recovering from the error.
Although, in practice, methods known as Hybrid redundancy which exploit both
static and dynamic techniques are typically used.
Also another sub-category of hardware redundancy is Recongurability to achieve
higher levels of reliability which can enable real-time and compile-time recongura-
tion with the aim of isolating faulty/defective units and reconguring at real-time
to keep the system running. Such methods are very well known when it comes to
using recongurable devices such as FPGAs. The eectiveness of any recongu-
ration scheme is measured by two aspects:
￿ The probability that a redundant unit can replace a faulty unit.
￿ The amount of reconguration overhead involved.
Numerous schemes have been proposed for reconguration [106] [107] [108] [109].
However the diculty and the complexity of using such reconguration methods
by exploiting arrays of processing units in practice, is still a major challenge and
it is out of the scope of this work.
A system with dynamic redundancy is comprised of several modules (usually iden-
tical) but only one of them is operating at a time. If a fault is detected in the
current operating module, it will be cut out and one of the spare modules will re-
place it. Therefore in dynamic redundancy systems, continuously fault detection
and recovery is taking place. The fault detection method can be based on periodic
tests, self-checking circuits or watchdog timers.
Assuring that the design is evaluated properly and has met the dened depend-
ability requirements is a signicant challenge. Generally speaking, the evaluation
methods for dependability can be classied into two main categories: quantitative
methods and qualitative methods. As the name implies, the qualitative methods
are usually subjective and such methods are used when certain factors and param-
eters related to the dependability of the system or the design cannot be quantied.
As the quantitative methods deal with numerical analysis and they are extracted
or represent certain dependability attributes of the system and each system can
have dierent dependability parameters.
To model the reliability of a system Markov models are commonly used [110] [111].
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that system can go into plus the possible transition paths between those states,
and the frequency of the parameters of those transitions. When analyzing the
reliability of a system, the transitions are typically repairs of failures. Markov
models can be represented graphically in a way that each state is shown as a
bubble and the transitions can be depicted as arrows connecting the bubbles (i.e
the states) as shown in Fig. 2.28. In Fig. 2.28, a single component that has just
two states: healthy and failed.
Figure 2.28: Markov model of a simple system
The Markov model representing such aforementioned systems are depicted in Fig.
2.29. State (1) represents the initial condition of working processors. The tran-
sition from state (1) to state (2) is labelled n* to represent the rate at which
any one of the processing units fails (Initially in fault/defect free situations, n=3
for TMR and n=2 for Stand-by systems). In this model, the assumption is that,
all of the processing units are identical, hence the failure rate  is the same for
every processing node. The system is in state (2) when one processor has failed.
In TMR for example, the transition from state (2) to state (3) has the rate 2
because only two working processors can fail and in Stand-by systems with one
redundant component, the transition from state (2) to state (3) has the rate . For
the Simplex system, state (2) is the death state while State (3) represents system
failure for TMR due to the fact that in that state the majority of the processors
in the system have failed. The same is true for Stand-by systems.
From the reliability analysis point of view, the failure distribution of electronics
devices is considered to be exponential. This is specically true for more mature
products as it has been demonstrated that their failure rates follow the exponential
distribution patten. Although for immature products and devices (i.e. new devices
that have just been manufactured and have not been thoroughly tested before mass
production) the failure rate is higher [110] [111]. The reliability issues can lead to
transient faults, intermittent faults or permanent faults.50 Chapter 2 Literature Review
Figure 2.29: Markov models
It is generally accepted that under normal conditions, the failure rate of systems
or individual components can be expressed as depicted in Fig. 2.30. A transient
fault as the name implies is temporary (like soft errors) while a permanent fault
is like a defect (hard errors). Intermittent faults can occur at regular intervals.
The classic bathtub curve is usually used to demonstrate the potential permanent
faults or hard errors. Hard errors can be the reason for both of the rst phase or
infant mortality and the second phase which is useful lifetime reliability as shown
in Fig. 2.30 [20] [19].
Figure 2.30: Bathtub curve showing the relationship between failure rate,
infant mortality, useful lifetime, and wearout phase [19].Chapter 2 Literature Review 51
1. The rst phase which starts at once at the beginning of the life span of a
system or a device has a very high failure rate that decreases over time. This is
the immature phase of a product which is usually known as Early failure phase
or infant mortality. This phase is due to the existence of a small sample of the
population that their defects cause very high failures in a short amount of time. It
is also possible that the failure rate at this phase can uctuate rather than having
an continuous descending curve, the way it is depicted in the gure above.
2. In the second stage is known as the useful lifetime - the time interval between
infant mortality and the wear out phase - in which the failure rate is usually almost
constant. The failure rate in this phase usually follows Poisson distribution as the
time interval is more or less xed.
3. The third stage which is called the wear out phase is the period of time in
which the failure rate increases rapidly and drastically. For our discussion, such
failures are caused by ageing, BTI and other reliability issues.
In industry, a methodology knows as 'burn-in' is used to skip the infant mortality
stage and reach the useful lifetime period faster. In burn-in tests, the chips are
overclocked at elevated temperatures and the test vectors (which have very high
activity rates) are applied to the chip. The aim of burn-in test is to make the
weakest transistors fail rapidly [112]. By utilizing the burn-in technique, the chips
that fail at the infant mortality stage (defective chips) can be spotted and removed
from the product line, hence only the chips that reach the useful lifetime properly
will become nal products. Also by adding margins and setting technology param-
eters, the industry will try to increase the condence level that the manufactures
chips will at least survive for the dened minimum lifetime span [19].
Reliability is typically quantied as MTBF (Mean Time Between Failures) for
repairable devices and MTTF (Mean Time To Failures) for non-repairable devices.
In repairable systems, MTBF is the sum of the mean time of MTTFs of the device
plus the MTTR (Mean time to repair/restore) as shown in Fig. 2.31 [20].
A system is assumed to function properly during most of its life-time. One way
to determine if the level of faults or system malfunctions is within the acceptable








(2.3)52 Chapter 2 Literature Review
Figure 2.31: Denitions for MTBF [20] [21]
Figure 2.32: Dierent phases of a repairable system
To practically assess the availability factor of a system, the temporal elements
should be replaced by other elements that represent the required functionality
of the system. Depending on the situation and the desired purposes from the
system, the availability factor should be dened with respect to eective 'Up time'
(work time) and 'Down time' (repair/maintenance time) as shown in Fig. 2.32.
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For simplication, two extra timing components are ignored here: waiting-for-
maintenance time and recovery-time. This is because in an ideal world, these two
timing components are zero. So to compute MTTR, only the maintenance time
for correction is considered. But in practice maintenance and recovery time can
be crucial. Particularly in safety-critical or medical applications such down-times
can even lead to human casualties or even in non-stop computing systems in which
losing even a few seconds of functionality or service can cause huge nancial losses.
Banks, reservation systems, servers or any infrastructures that deal with giving
services to users are under this category. In such applications, occasional loss
of services or disconnections is acceptable only if the system can restore quickly
and provide the usual services to the end users with minimum downtime, rapid
maintenance and low service delays.
Recently, the word \reliability" has been substituted by the term \dependability".
Any methodology for designing, implementing and testing of the dependable sys-
tems must be able to identify the root causes of failures rst. It should be able to
predict the manifestations of such failures and eventually use the appropriate tech-
nology and techniques to deal with such failures at a releasable cost and tolerable
overheads [20]
Preventing failures is the key factor in building dependable systems. To achieve
this, is it crucial to understand the roots of the failures and the events that lead
to such failures. A lot of failures can be temporarily inactive and latent for a
specic period of time until they manifest themselves. In other words, a failure
is in eect the external observation of an error inside the system. So errors are
hidden until they become active which will lead to failures (externally observable).
The failure themselves could also be present but not externally visible to the user.
In other words, it also depends on the scope of observing the system. A failure in
a sub-component might be totally hidden to the top-level without corrupting the
desired system outputs. To make it even more complex, it is known that, similar
failures can be rooted in dierent errors while the same errors can be responsible
for dierent failures.54 Chapter 2 Literature Review
2.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter the rst objective \To investigate the impacts of variation and re-
liability issues on UDSM CMOS circuits from a design perspective" has been ad-
dressed. This chapter provides a survey of various UDSM impacts on circuits and
devices, reviewing the ongoing research and providing a summary of the state-of-
the-art techniques to mitigate the UDSM impacts mainly the impacts of variation,
soft errors and the reliability issues.
At 65nm, variation in transistor channel lengths and Vth in terms of standard
deviation , has reached to 10% and the trend for deeper sub-micron technologies
show that this is increasing. From a hardware designers' point of view, inherently
the implementation of any of such fault-tolerance mechanism involves imposing
additional overheads. Furthermore, redundancy will certainly have impacts on
performance, power dissipation, weight, and size of the system. TMR as the most
conventional fault tolerant technique imposes more than 200% overhead while its
reliability is close to 100%, provided that only one out of three modules becomes
faulty at any time, and of course if the majority voter is 100% robust. Thus a
good fault tolerant design is a trade-o between the level of dependencies provided
and the amount of redundancies used. or in other words, a good design is a trade-
o between the cost of incorporating fault tolerance and the cost of errors that,
includes losses due to downtime and the cost of erroneous results.
In the next chapter we investigate the timing vulnerability of UDSM circuits. The
focus will be on the timing vulnerability to Soft errors and particularly Single-
Event-Transients (SETs).Chapter 3
Soft Errors and Timing
Vulnerability
An mentioned, soft errors are a signicant reliability issue for Ultra-Deep-Sub-
Micron (UDSM) CMOS circuits. Therefore, an accurate assessment of the Soft-
Error-Rate (SER) is crucial. In this part, we argue that the conventional de-
nitions for the Window of Vulnerability (WOV) are too conservative and hence
under-estimate the risk. We propose a new method for determining the timing
factors and WOV for the sequential elements from the susceptibility perspective
rather than the conventional performance perspective. Our methodology leads to
a more realistic denition of the WOV for SER computation.
3.1 Introduction
As explained in chapter 2, section 2.2.2, because of decreasing circuit capacitance
and increasing circuit speed, the SETs are becoming more important with the
scaling of the technology [113] [55]. In recent years, despite reductions in the
gate oxide thickness and increases in doping densities, which generally mitigate
the susceptibility to soft errors, the reduced device dimensions and accompanying
technological changes have resulted in increased sensitivity to transient radiation
eects and particle hits [114] [115].
The impact of direct particle strikes on memory elements (SEUs) is well studied
and various radiation-hardening techniques have been proposed to decrease the
SER in memory blocks. However, the role of combinational elements along with
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latches and ip-ops in determining the SER has not been investigated compre-
hensively. SER is the cumulative result of transient events on sequential elements
and combinational parts in a circuit. This is quite dierent from SEUs on mem-
ory blocks such as SRAMs. The transient pulse caused by a particle strike can be
captured by the sequential elements depending on the existence of an active path
from the struck node to the storage element, the arrival time and the width of the
transient pulse at the storage element input [50] [51].
The transient pulse can be captured by a ip-op a t the down stream logic and
cause an error if it is not masked by any of logic, electrical or temporal mask-
ing phenomena. Of these three masking eects, temporal masking is of greatest
interest, since it plays a signicant role in determining the SER [113]. In this
chapter, we rst take a survey of the conventional denitions for the Window of
Vulnerability (WOV), then we propose our method in determining the WOV from
the susceptibility perspective and at last we apply our method to determine the
WOV of sequential cells for 130nm, 90nm and 45nm technologies.
3.2 Window of Vulnerability
A ip-op is susceptible to capturing a spurious transient pulse, if it occurs inside
the ip-op's latching window, aperture window or window of vulnerability. The
WOV is the basic factor in determining the eectiveness of temporal masking. To
date, the WOV has been dened as the sum of the Setup time and Hold time
constraints of the ip-op [51] [116] [117].
Figure 3.1: Flip-Flop Timing
As shown in Fig. 3.1, a common approach to characterizing the setup (hold) time
is to consider the setup (hold) time with respect to the CLK-to-Q delay (TCQ),
while keeping a xed value for the hold (setup) time [118] [119] [120]. According toChapter 3 Soft Errors and Timing Vulnerability 57
[120] [118], the output of the ip-op falls into three regions: Stable, Metastable
and Failure. In other words, depending on the size of the WOV and the width
of the input pulse, the ip-op can either latch the input data properly (stable
region), become metastable, or fail to latch the input data as shown in Fig. 3.2.
Figure 3.2: 45nm Technology - SPICE simulation of Flip-Flop output
using Nangate 45nm SPICE models: When the input pulse is `1' for one
clock cycle with varying input pulse width: Stable, Metastable and Failure
regions.
Moreover, the chance of the ip-op falling into the metastable region due to hold
time violations is higher than for setup time violations, Fig. 3.3.
Figure 3.3: 45nm Technology - SPICE simulation of Flip-Flop output using
Nangate 45nm SPICE models: Chances of metastability due to Hold time
violations and Setup time violations.
The setup and hold times are traditionally calculated for the best performance.
The setup time, Tsetup, is usually dened as the D-to-Clock delay (TDC) at which
the Minimum D-to-Q delay (TDQ) occurs, as depicted in Fig. 3.1, [119] [121].
The setup time, Tsetup, is the time that input D must fall or rise before the clock58 Chapter 3 Soft Errors and Timing Vulnerability
Figure 3.4: Fastest output vs Slowest output depending on the input pulse
width and the pulse arrival time - 45nm technology
edge so that the data is properly captured with the least possible TDQ. Industry
standard EDA tools utilize the same procedure for sequential cell characterization.
For instance, to perform cell characterization, a series of pass/fail simulations are
run on the sequential cells to determine the setup and hold times for the minimum
output delay [122]. The values of setup and hold times are chosen in a conservative
manner to guarantee the best performance; the ip-op might still capture its
input properly with a longer Clock-to-Q delay (TCQ) even if the data changes in
less than the dened setup and hold times as shown in Fig. 3.4.
In [51], the setup time is dened as the D-to-Clock oset (TDC) that corresponds
to a 10% increase in the Clock-to-Q delay (TCQ). Consequently, the conventional
Window of Vulnerability (WOV) is dened as the sum of the setup and hold time
windows around the clock edge during which the input data must not change.
Using this denition, any pulse with a width equal to or greater than TDC +
10%TCQ occurring around the clock edge, can be captured and any pulse narrower
than this value will be masked and ltered out.
Our transistor-level simulations show that pulses which are much narrower than
this conventional denition of WOV can, in fact, be captured and cause an error.
In our SPICE simulation setup, we used a chain of inverters connected to a op-op
and we injected SET pulses with various pulse widths and measured the ip-op
output. The transistor models were from Nangate 45nm cell library. For instance,
considering the denition given in [51] and using the timing information for the
45nm cell library, the width of the WOV must be equal to 80 ps and any pulse
narrower than 80 ps would not be captured, but for example a pulse with a width
of 48 ps is captured by the ip-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To the best of our knowledge, all the proposed denitions for the WOV and tempo-
ral masking eectiveness in the literature assume the above. In the next part, rst
we propose a new method to determine the WOV for the ip-ops from the sus-
ceptibility perspective and then we discuss the timing vulnerability and temporal
masking eectiveness for Ultra-Deep-Sub-Micron CMOS technologies.
3.3 Methodology
From the susceptibility perspective, we dene the WOV as the region around the
clock edge where the narrowest input pulse can be properly captured and the ip-
op output stays in the stable region disregarding the minimum D-to-Output delay
(TDQ). To dene this region, two points around the clock edge are determined:
1. The point (usually) before the clock edge, such that any input pulse starting
after this time will not be captured properly by the ip-op, no matter how
wide the input pulse is. This is the point where any later-starting pulse will
result in the ip-op output falling into the metastable or failure regions.
2. The point (usually) after the clock edge, such that any input pulse ending
before this time will not be captured properly by the ip-op, no matter how
wide the input pulse is. This is the point where any pulse ending earlier than
this will result in the ip-op output falling into the metastable or failure
regions.
From simulations, a pulse with a width of the time between these two points will
not be captured, but we observe that a pulse of approximately twice this width
has sucient energy to change the ip-op state and hence will be captured, Fig.
3.5.
3.4 Results
Using Spice, we applied our methodology to nd the narrowest capturable pulse
width at 130nm, 90nm, 65nm and 45nm technologies. We used the fastest slew
rate for the input pulse and the clock signal as specied in the timing library
le ranging from 5ps to 450ps at 45nm. For the 130nm technology the minimum60 Chapter 3 Soft Errors and Timing Vulnerability
Figure 3.5: Dening the Window of Vulnerability
Table 3.1: An example of determining the minimum capturable pulse
width - SPICE simulations using Nangate 45m technology library
Determining the minimum capturable pulse width










Common Region 0.0167 -
Min Pulse Width 0.0334 Stable
captured pulse width is 65 ps. For the 90nm technology, the narrowest capturable
pulse is observed to be 56 ps, and about 44 ps for 65nm and at last the narrowest
capturable pulse width at 45nm is approximately 34 ps - Table 3.1. Note that to
consider the worst case scenario, we used the smallest cells, so by up-sizing the
cells, one could get better WOV immunity. This suggests that transient pulses
with the widths equal to or greater than these values can be potentially captured
by the ip-op if they reach the ip-op during the clock transition. These values
are much less than the dened setup/hold time values in the cell library data-
sheets, owing to the fact that the timing factors and minimum input pulse width
for the sequential cells are characterized for the best performance rather than the
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The results also suggest that the immunity against very narrow pulses and single-
event-transients decreases with the technology scaling to UDSM as depicted in Fig.
3.6. It is noteworthy to mention the similarity between our method and previous
methods for determining the metastability decay constant  of the sequential cells
[123] i.e. the amount of time that a ip-op stays in the metastable region. The
values of  are calculated from experimental data obtained by uniformly varying
the separation between the clock and event input timing. Since the obtained
values are based on the experiments and observations and various factors such as
process technology, temperature, supply voltage, clock rise time, etc inuence the
obtained values, thus formal denition of the WOV with agreeable precision is not
achievable.
Figure 3.6: Minimum Captured Pulse Width by the Flip-Flops at three
dierent technology nodes.
3.5 SET, WOV and Mitigation Factors
It is noteworthy to mention the importance of internal buers inside the ip-
op cell in determining the minimum capturable pulse width. The most common
approach for constructing an edge-triggered register is to use a Master-Slave con-
guration as shown in Fig. 3.7. The clock inverters and the buers between the
master and the slave latches inside the ip-op cell can increase or decrease the
minimum pulse width by adding or subtracting delays and clock skews. Since most
of the sequential cells in UDSM cell libraries are based on master-slave latches,
this factor can be used as a control knob to adjust the minimum capturable pulse
width. By changing the size of the buers inside the ip-op, we can relatively
achieve less susceptibility to narrow SET pulses by imposing some area and delay
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Figure 3.7: Master-Slave Flip-Flop
The minimum capturable pulse width for the 1X ip-ops in 45nm Nangate tech-
nology library has been observed to be 34 ps. By modifying the size of the clock
inverter transistors between the master and the slave latches inside the ip-op
cell, the minimum pulse width can be increased from 34 ps to 100 ps and more.
For instance, by increasing the transistor length, the minimum capturable pulse
width of 109 ps can be achieved as depicted in Table 3.2. Consequently, for this
particular internal inverter size, the ip-op is immune to SET pulses with a width
below 109 ps; which is approximately three times higher than the default value
for the minimum capturable pulse width at 45 nm technology.
However the trade-o in the performance and the area should be considered. The
rise or fall time depends on the channel resistance, which in-turn, depends on the
device dimensions. The bigger the channel length, the larger the gate capacitance,
hence the slower the circuit. With few exceptions, designers always use the smallest
possible length available in a process to achieve the fastest speeds. There is more
scope for varying the transistor width; for the case of an inverter, as the NMOS
width increases, the fall time decreases but the rise time increases and as the
PMOS width increases the rise time decreases but the fall time increases. The
area taken up by the inverter must be also taken into account. The reduction in
delay must be traded o against the increased area (and power) when the widths
are increased. This is a cost-performance trade-o.
Moreover, interconnect capacitance plays an important role in masking the tran-
sient pulses and reducing the SER. Our simulations show that certain amount
of capacitance at the output of the struck node attens the transient pulse and
reduces the pulse amplitude in such a way that the transient pulse cannot be
sensed by the next combinational or sequential gate. For instance, we have run
10k Monte carlo simulations on 45nm chains of inverters and a ip-op at the end
with various output capacitances at the struck node and diverse SET pulse widths
and amplitudes. The results are depicted in Fig. 3.8. It has been observed thatChapter 3 Soft Errors and Timing Vulnerability 63
Table 3.2: Decreasing SET susceptibility using internal buering re-sizing
at 45 nm technology. Note that non-default values are non-physical as this
is an experiment to look at operating boundaries.
Clock inverting transistors inside the ip-op cell
Transistor Width Transistor Length Min Capturable Pulse
0.27U (Default) 0.05U (Default) 34 ps
0.027U (Decreased) 0.05U (Default) 95 ps
0.27U (Default) 0.5U (Increased) 76 ps
0.27U (Default) 1.0U (Increased) 109 ps
the only key point from the SER perspective is the stuck node; the other nodes
and their capacitance along the combinational path to the memory element almost
have no eect on the generated SET, therefore the capacitances on the these nodes
do not matter.
Figure 3.8: Capacitance at the struck node and SER
We also observed that the clock rise-time plays an important role in determining
the location of the WOV. For very fast clock rise-times, the input pulse is captured
right before the clock starts to rise as shown in Fig 3.9, but not with the minimum
TDQ. This is due to the internal state change of the Master-Slave latches inside
the ip-op.
3.6 Variation and the WOV
One of the major UDSM impacts on the devices are the variations discussed in
Chapters 1 and 2 which cause signicant unpredictability in the power and per-
formance characteristics of integrated circuits. For a more accurate and realistic
Failure In Time (FIT) and SER computation, the impacts of such variation must64 Chapter 3 Soft Errors and Timing Vulnerability
Figure 3.9: Narrow pulse properly captured right before the clock edge -
45nm technology
be taken into account. In this section, we investigate the impacts of variations on
the WOV and the minimum pulse width.
Fig. 3.10 and Fig. 3.11 have been obtained using 10k Monte Carlo simulations to
determine the vulnerability of 1X ip-ops (at 45nm Nangate technology) to SETs
in the presence of process variations. Two parameters were chosen to mimic the
impact of variation on transistors: Threshold voltage (Vth) and Oxide Thickness
(Tox). For each of the experiments resulting in gs 3.11 and 3.22, Vth and Tox were
varied fractionally to approximate the eect of process and intrinsic variations
on both the sub-threshold and saturation regimes of device operation and the
minimum captured pulse width has been determined.
The results show that even in presence of variations, the ip-ops are still very
susceptible to narrow pulses and SETs. With 40% variation on Vth, the ip-
ops could only cancel the 34 ps pulses in less than 60% of the cases and with
40% variation on Tox this immunity is less than 50% of the cases. The situation
is aggravated when the pulses get wider in such a way that for pulses above 40
ps, the immunity and the probability to lter out the pulses are almost zero as
depicted in Fig. 3.10 and Fig 3.11. In other words, variation does not have any
signicant impact on the minimum pulse width and it eectively neither improves
nor reduces the vulnerability to very narrow pulses.
3.7 WOV and Soft Error Rate
The Soft Error Rate (SER) of any circuits can be dened as the average of all of
the upset events for all of the particle strike times tstrike, with the collected chargesChapter 3 Soft Errors and Timing Vulnerability 65
Figure 3.10: 45nm technology
Figure 3.11: 45nm technology
Qi over all of the circuit nodes n. An is the impacted area of the struck node (drain
area) and Prob(Qi,n) is the probability that charge Qi is collected for every high
energy particle at the struck node n. In this formula, the value of Upsetj,i,n is 1 if
and only if node n is upset by collected charge Qi at strike time tstrike [124] [125].
We dene an upset to be the condition in which the output of the struck node n















The WOV can be dened as:
WOV = n;i =
Tcycle X
j=tstrike
Upsetj;i;nt (3.2)66 Chapter 3 Soft Errors and Timing Vulnerability
Whereas the conventional WOV is equal to the sum of the setup and hold times.











As the WOV can directly aect the SER.
For memory arrays such as SRAM cells, it is generally safe to assume that n,i=T cycle
is a constant value and equal to the duty cycle. For combinatorial circuits it de-
pends on the location of the struck node in the downstream logic path and its
distance to the destination ip-op or latch, as the SETs can be masked logically
or electrically (as discussed in section 3.1).








In the formula above, the Masking factor is the canceling-out eect such as electri-
cal masking or logical masking, and the SETfactor will depend on the ux energy,
the impacted area, critical charge and charge collection eciency of the devices
for the nodes in the circuit.
Using the data for particle ux & critical charge per technology node data from [42]
[57], and our calculated WOV, the SER of a chain of inverter circuit for 130nm,
90nm, 65nm and 45m can be calculated as shown in Table 3.3. The average
SET PW of 45nm is extrapolated based on the values from 180nm down to 65nm
technologies. Note that the logical masking and electrical masking factors have
been ignored here as they would depend on the circuit topology, the layout and
schematics, which would vary from circuit to circuit. We consider the worst case
scenario.
From a reliability perspective, this means that to be able to account for SETs and
to minimize SER, we need to characterize sequential cells beyond the conventional
Setup and Hold time margins. We would need to make sure we have characterized
the ip-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Table 3.3: Average of SET-induced SER of dierent technology nodes -
SER = FIT : Number of failures in 109 hours of operation
Calculated SER and WOV
Technology Min Capturable PW Average SET PW SET-induced SER (FIT)
130nm 65 ps 400 ps [126] [127] 1
90nm 56 ps 500 ps [128] [129] 101
65nm 44 ps 600 ps [130] 103
45nm 34 ps 700 ps (extrapolated) 104
captured by the ip-op or the latch has been considered; even though it might
result in a longer clk-to-q delay.
Moreover, we can characterize the SEE vulnerability of combinatorial cells in a
look-up table fashion that can augment a standard cell library. Later, this data
can be used to obtain more accurate circuit level SET-induced SER. To test the
feasibility of this, we used our WOV methodology, SPICE and the formulas above
to characterize and compute the results of FIT for an INVX1 cell connected to a
DFFX1 Flip-Flop cell at 45nm for various SET pulse widths vs. dierent loads as
shown in Table 3.4 The output loads are the values that are fed to the Flip-Flop
input. The slew rate of 20ps (which is very fast for 45nm) has been used for the
clock signal to account for the worst case scenario.
The steps in calculating (SET-pulse, output-load) pairs and creating the FIT tables
are explained below:
1. Min pair (Min SET, min output-load): Use SPICE to derive the 3-sigma
probability distribution function (PDF) of the minimum capturable pulse
width using our proposed WOV methodology with the minimum output
load in the presence of process variation. Take the value of \   3" as the
minimum point of SET-Load table.
2. Max pair (Min SET, Max output-load): Use SPICE to derive the 3-sigma
probability distribution function (PDF) of the minimum capturable pulse
width using our proposed WOV methodology with the maximum output
load in the presence of process variation. Take the value of \   3" as the
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3. Middle pairs: Divide the range between the Min pair and the Max pair into
equal sections N. The value of N depends on the desired level of precision
for the nal SER-FIT table. Derive the N Middle pairs.
4. Calculate the technology specic SER FIT of the Min pair, Max pair and the
N Middle pairs between, using the formulas above, based on the technology
data.
In this example, the Threshold voltage (Vth) and Oxide Thickness (Tox) were the
chosen transistor parameters for variation in the 10k Monte Carlo runs. To nd
the min pulse width, in each scenario, the pulse height has been assumed to be
constant Max i.e. VDD.
Table 3.4: FIT-SET Char Table : INVX1 - Input = 0 - DFFX1
SET Pulse Width (ps) 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
Output Load (pF)
10 100 150 250 400 550 700 950 1000
20 80 120 220 390 510 650 860 950
30 65 100 200 350 470 600 770 900
40 35 55 180 290 390 560 720 850
50 20 40 120 220 330 510 650 800
The cell-specic SET-FIT data can be compiled and added to the design library
along with the timing libraries. Such tables can be expanded to more dimensions to
also include various slew rates and other signicant factors such as supply voltage.
In this case, by considering the output load, slew rate, the supply voltage as well
as the SET pulse-width, we can obtain more accurate understanding of the SER
of the circuit.
This is a rst step towards generating SET FIT tables for WOV of ip-ops and
latches. The results of such table are still pessimistic because of the following
challenges:
￿ The rst assumption is the minimum SET pulse width data is Gaussian.
This is not necessary true. There are some scenarios where the data can
fall into heavy-tailed distributions. Therefore the term \   3" might not
represent the worst case. When dealing with non-Gaussian data, the term
\ 3" will not necessarily represent the the worst case corner. For instance,
if the data distribution is Weibull or Log-normal (which is very common for
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and  parameters as Weibull distributions are parametrized by  (size) and
K (shape), and depending on the values of  and K, the distribution can have
zero tail on the left and very long tail on the right and \   3" become
meaningless in this case. The same happens for Log-normal distributions
which is dened by a shape and log-scale parameters and depending on the
the values of these parameters, Log-normal distributions have very long tails
on the right side.
￿ For simplicity and to save computation time and resources, we have assumed
that the SET pulse height is xed. In reality we will have to deal with bi-
variate distribution (Pulse Width and Pulse Height) or even multivariate
distribution (Pulse Width, Pulse Height, Pulse Shape, Area under the pulse,
etc) that again will not necessarily show Gaussian behaviors.
3.8 Discussion
The pulse width of transient glitches due to a particle hit is reported to be in the
range of [78 ps, 206 ps] for 130 nm technology [126]. In [127] it is reported that,
SET pulses range from about 400 ps to about 700 ps in a 130 nm process and
this range increases to about 500 ps to 900 ps for a 90 nm process. Cannon et
al. [128], measured heavy ion and proton-induced SETs in inverters, NAND and
NOR gates for 90 nm technology. They observed SET pulses less than 400 ps wide
in their library. In [129], a test circuit has been implemented to measure SET in
IBM 130 nm and 90 nm processes. Test measurements with heavy ions and alpha
particles show transient widths ranging from 100 ps to over 1 ns.
Although these empirical results reported in the literature slightly contradict each
other, one point is evident: the minimum reported pulse width for the SETs due to
particle hits in the literature is still much wider than the minimum captured pulse
width as we observed in our simulations, making them susceptible to the SETs.
This also suggests that SETs can lead to double-bit errors in UDSM circuits with
clock frequencies in the GHz range, because pulses wider than one clock cycle
can be captured by two consecutive clock cycles and eventually create double-bit
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3.9 Concluding Remarks
This chapter addresses the second objective \To investigate timing vulnerability
of UDSM combinational circuits and present a more realistic methodology to de-
termine the vulnerability". We have presented an analysis of the conventional
denitions for the WOV and have proposed a method to determine the minimum
capturable pulse width for sequential cells which will lead to a more realistic SER
computation. As suggested in the literature, the pulse-width of the most common
SETs increases, for the same radiation environment, with technology scaling. This
demonstrates the increasing importance of combinational logic soft errors. Con-
sidering this assumption for 45 nm technology and below, there is a high chance of
transient pulses being captured by the ip-ops, because the WOV is very narrow
at UDSM. Moreover, in circuits with GHz clock frequencies, this can even lead to
double-bit errors rather than the conventional expectation of single-bit soft errors.
Therefore conventional fault-tolerant techniques and single-bit error detection and
correction methods may not be sucient.
We also observed that interconnect capacitance plays an important role in masking
the transient pulses and reducing the SER. Our simulations show that a certain
amount of capacitance at the output of the struck node attens the transient pulse
and reduces the pulse amplitude in such a way that the transient pulse cannot be
sensed by the next combinational or sequential gate. For instance, our simulations
show that for typical 45 nm technology a load capacitance of greater than 20 fF
at the output of the struck node attens the SETs. Of course the exact amount of
interconnect capacitance is not available before the place & route stage. For a more
realistic calculation of SER, we should also consider interconnect capacitance.
Some of the results of the work in this chapter have been published as:
￿ M.M. Ghahroodi; M. Zwolinski; R. Wong; S.J. Wen, "Timing Vulnerabil-
ity Factors of Ultra Deep-sub-micron CMOS," European Test Symposium
(ETS), 2011 16th IEEE , vol., no., pp.202,202, 23-27 May 2011Chapter 4
Soft Errors and Radiation
Hardening By Design
Soft errors induced by radiation, causing malfunctions in electronic systems and
circuits, have become one of the most challenging issues that impact the reliability
of the modern processors even for sea-level applications. In this chapter we present
an implementation of a radiation-hardened 32-bit pipe-lined Processor as well
as two novel radiation-hardening techniques at gate-level. We present an SEU
tolerant Flip-Flop design with 38% less power overhead and 25% less area overhead
at 65nm technology compared to the conventional TMR Flip-Flop design. We
also present an SEU-tolerant Clock-gating scheme with less than 50% area-power
overheads and no performance penalty, compared to the conventional TMR for
clock-gating. Our simulations show that the proposed schemes can recover from
SEU errors in 99% of the cases.
4.1 Introduction
Since the main scope of this chapter is radiation hardening at gate-level, it is
noteworthy to discuss Razor I and Razor II ip-op architectures. Initially Ra-
zor ip-op architecture has been introduced as a dynamic in-situ detection and
correction of speed path failures. In the Razor methodology, the ip-ops in the
critical paths are replaced by specic op-ops called Razor (Fig. 4.1). A Razor
ip-op is comprised of a normal ip-op and a shadow latch which receives the
clock signal through a delay elements. Here the assumption is that, variability in
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silicon, IR drop, noise, temperature and their manifestation as delay variation will
show up on the critical paths rst.
Figure 4.1: Razor I Flip-Flop [14]
In order to eectively address the design and timing issues in Razor I, Razor II
was proposed.
Any delay increase that goes beyond the latching window of the downstream ip-
op in the critical paths will cause the ip-ops to fail in receiving the data. In
this situation, the shadow latch will receive the correct data as the clock feeding
the shadow latch is delayed by design. The comparator will compare the output of
the ip-op and the output of the shadow latch, hence the error can be detected.
Here the problem is handling metastability conditions. This is because in the razor
methodology, the system clock frequency is set based on the typical condition
which does not unnecessarily cover the worst case scenario. This means the setup
and hold time margins are calculated for the typical condition and in any chip that
works in worst case scenario or slow corner or best case scenario or fast corner,
there will be serious setup or hold time violations leading to metastability in the
ip-ops. One of the features of Razor-style architectures is their ability to detect
SEUs.
Razor I Features & Drawbacks:
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Figure 4.2: Razor II Flip-Flop [14]
￿ Only implemented on the Critical paths.
￿ Generation of a Global restore signal that goes to every pipeline ip-op.
This imposes signicant timing constraints.
￿ Design of the meta-stability detector under the process variation is di-
cult. Because it needs to respond to meta-stable FF outputs across process
corners.
￿ Additional risk of meta-stability on the restore signal itself that can poten-
tially lead to system failures.
￿ Energy gain below the point-of-rst-failure (POFF) is small (10%) compared
to the energy gain from eliminating process-voltage-temperature (PVT) mar-
gins (35% to 45%). Due to the increase of the errors below POFF and the
energy needed for recovery.
￿ Timing Error detection & Correction on the y (at Flip-Flop level)
Razor II Features & Drawbacks:
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￿ No need for a global pipeline restore signal, hence relaxing the timing con-
straints.
￿ Smaller in size, reduced clock pin capacitance (just one latch, unlike Razor
I that is comprised of a Master-Slave FF plus one shadow Latch) hence less
power, area overhead.
￿ Capable SEU detection.
￿ Error Detection only at Flip-Flop level (Recovery occurs at micro-architectural
level)
￿ Increased cost of Instruction-per-cycle (IPC) penalty during recovering com-
paring to Razor I.
￿ Conventional Design ow has to be modied, because two dierent Clock
trees are required: one for Critical Razor II ip-ops and one for non-Critical
Razor II ip-ops. Otherwise excessive buer insertion is required to balance
the paths.
In the next part, we discuss the physical implementation of a rad-hard processor
using the TMR scheme that we have done and then we propose two novel radiation-
hardening techniques at gate-level; one for SEU-tolerant ip-op design and the
other for SEU-tolerant clock-gating scheme in a fully synchronous system.
4.2 Radiation Hardening of a 32 bit real-time
processor at gate-level
We implement the TMR version of ARM Cortex-R4 [22] in 65nm general purpose
technology node. The ARM Cortex-R Series embedded processors are fast, real-
time and cost eective. They oer high performance, highly deterministic behav-
ior, and built in safety features. Cortex-R4 is an implementation of the ARMv7-R
architecture specically designed for deeply embedded real-time applications such
as HDD/SSD storage controllers, communications modems, and electronic control
units (ECUs) for automotive and industrial systems. It oers signicant energy
eciency, real-time response and predictable performance for real-time systems.
The block diagram of Cortex-R4 is shown in Fig 4.3.Chapter 4 Soft Errors and Radiation Hardening By Design 75
Figure 4.3: ARM Cortex-R4 [22]
Coretx-R4 has an 8-stage in-order dual-issue CPU pipeline, optional Memory Pro-
tection Unit (MPU) and CoreSight debug and trace units. It has optional tightly-
coupled memories (TCMs), instruction/data caches and double-precision oating-
point unit. Also, two 64-bit master and slave AXI ports are used to communicate
with the external world. All caches and TCMs can be protected by ECC or parity
against SEUs.
Cortex-R4 can also be used in a dual-core lock step (DCLS) conguration where
a second redundant CPU can run in lock step with the rst one. Both cores will
share inputs and caches, and the outputs of the CPU are compared at every cycle
to detect errors. This feature is used mainly in automotive systems but may also be
useful for some space and avionics applications. The key dierence between these
two methods is that the majority voting of the TMR system enables the system
to continue after a SEU or SET, providing tolerance and maintaining availability.
With DCLS an SEU or SET can be detected but the correct result is unknown,
as there is no majority voting, so the system must take an appropriate corrective
action.
The Cortex-R4 CPU micro-architecture is mature and has undergone extensive
verication and validation processes as an industrial product. Any change in the
CPU micro-architecture will have repercussions in verication, validation. For
these reasons, we opted to triplicate all the sequential cells at gate-level in a76 Chapter 4 Soft Errors and Radiation Hardening By Design
product-quality CPU. All the ip-ops and latches are replaced by their TMR
versions in the gate-level net-list. A majority voter is used to compare the output
of the triplicated cell. Only the sequential cells are triplicated, so no redundancy
is required for the combinational logic in the design.
The Synopsys IC compiler implementation ow is used to compile and place &
route the entire design with the new TMR cell replacing the ip-ops of the default
design. SPICE-level simulation is performed to validate the correct functionality
of the design and the radiation immunity of the TMR cell. SET pulses of various
widths are applied to the input of the TMR cell with various widths to nd the
point-of-failure in SET immunity. Dierent SET immunity levels can be achieved
depending on the amount of input delay in the delay cells. For the case of our
TMR cell, the immunity is for SET pulses with a width of 105ps. Any SET pulse
wider than this can be potentially captured (depending on its time of arrival and
its relation to the clock rising-edge) and cause an error. We have measured the
target clock frequency, silicon area, and dynamic power. The results are presented
normalized to the baseline Cortex-R4 CPU in Fig. 4.12, Fig. 4.13, Fig. 4.16 and
Fig. 4.17. The target clock frequency of the TMR version is 35% slower than the
baseline Cortex-R4. This is mainly because of the additional delays in the delay
elements and majority voters in the TMR cells.
We use a baseline Cortex-R4 that does not have the optional oating-point unit
and TCMs. However, it has instruction and data caches of 16KB each. Both caches
are protected by ECC. So we take the TMR cell and apply it to every single ip-
op in the design excluding the caches, as they are protected by ECCs. Ideally,
we should triplicate every single sequential cell in the cell library, characterize
them and eventually add them to the cell library. During design implementation,
the ECAD tools must be limited to choose only the TMR version of each ip-
op cell from the cell library. In this preliminary study, we pursue a non-optimal
alternative where a single ip-op cell that has all the functionalities (Set, Reset,
etc) is selected from the standard cell library, and then this cell is triplicated to
replace all the cells in the design.
To rad-hard a circuit, every single storage element (such as ip-ops or latches)
should be hardened. We divide the core into two major parts: The core and the
cache as depicted in Fig. 4.4. In our case, the memory and the data and instruction
caches are protected with ECC, therefore our focus is on the core itself.
The rad-hard scheme we have used is based on spatial and temporal redundancy
as shown in Fig. 4.5. In this case, all the ip-ops and latches will be immune toChapter 4 Soft Errors and Radiation Hardening By Design 77
Figure 4.4: Processor Core
SEUs and SETs with certain pulse widths. It is noteworthy to mention that the
immunity of this scheme to SETs depends on the amount of delays in the delays
elements. By adding bigger delay elements, the SET immunity will increase at the
cost of lost performance. Because the added delay elements will also add to the
delay of all the path and especially in the case of the critical paths, this can be a
huge performance drawback.
Figure 4.5: SEE Tolerant TMR Flip-Flop
For physical implementation, we used a 65nm general purpose TSMC standard cell
library. A major bottle-neck is the lack of a TMR cell library. The cell library we
have used contains 184 Sequential cells with various drive strengths. Implementing
the SEE tolerant scheme on every one of these cells would be very time consuming
and impractical, because it requires characterizing each new cell and then adding
it to the library. A practical way of performing this task is to limit the synthesis
tool in choosing only our design TMR cell. In this case, by just designing one
TMR cell and forcing the EDA tools to use it we can implement the radiation78 Chapter 4 Soft Errors and Radiation Hardening By Design
hardened version of the core much more quickly, but not optimally. Our proposed
ow for choosing the right sequential cell for hardening is depicted in Fig.4.6.
Figure 4.6: The proposed ow and the major steps in implementing a
Rad-Hard core
Figure 4.7: Default Sequential Cell usage by the coreChapter 4 Soft Errors and Radiation Hardening By Design 79
As depicted in Fig. 4.7, the sequential cell SDFFQ-X1M-A12TR is the cell most
used by the tools, but not all the sequential cells in the core core can be replaced
by only this cell, because it does not have a Reset pin and some parts of the logic in
the core need the Reset functionality. Therefore instead of that we picked the same
cell but with a Reset input called SDFFSRPQ-X1M-A12TR which is a positive
edge triggered static D-type ip-op. This will be our jack-of-all-trades ip-op.
We have created a new cell named SDFFSRPQ-X1M-A12TR-TMR, which is a
rad-hard version of that sequential cell. This new cell is comprised of 3 Flip-ops,
delay elements and a majority voter as shown in Fig. 4.8 and Fig.4.9.
Figure 4.8: TMR cell schematic
Figure 4.9: TMR cell layout
To validate the SET tolerance of the new cell, pulses have been injected into
the ip-op input in SPICE simulation. The simulation results show that this80 Chapter 4 Soft Errors and Radiation Hardening By Design
architecture at 65nm is totally immune to the SETs with widths lower than 105
ps.
After adding the new cell to the library, the whole core has been synthesized and
placed and routed using the new TMR cell as the only available cell to the tools.
Since the new TMR cell is much bigger than a normal ip-op, the oor plan must
be expanded. Due to the fact that the cache memory consists of hard macro cells
which are designed separately and oor-planned in the design at the bottom, it is
easier to extend the oor plan from the top or at either side without moving the
macro cells, as show in Fig. 4.10.
We have measured the total dynamic power of the design at post-layout. Total
dynamic power increases by 41% in comparison to the baseline Cortex-R4 at its
target CPU clock frequency. Because the clock frequency of the TMR design is
35% lower than the baseline Cortex-R4, then its total dynamic power is about 40%
higher than the Cortex-R4 in spite of its doubled chip area. If the TMR version
ran at the same clock frequency as the baseline, then we would expect the total
dynamic power overhead to be closer to 100% higher based on 50-50 switching
activity on average.
Figure 4.10: Extending Floor Plan
Post placed and route results are shown in the Fig. 4.11.
We have implemented four dierent versions of the core. 1) The default core, 2)
The core with the jack-of-all-trades Flip-Flop, 3) The core with the TMR Flip-
Flop, 4) The core with TMR scheme on Flip-Flops and the Clock gating latches.
The power comparisons are shown in Fig. 4.12 and Fig. 4.13.Chapter 4 Soft Errors and Radiation Hardening By Design 81
Figure 4.11: Core vs Core TMR
As shown in Fig. 4.14, Fig. 4.15 and Fig. 4.16, the chip area has been doubled
because all ip-ops are triplicated. The area of an individual TMR cell is about
6 times larger than a regular ip-op. In the original Cortex-R4, sequential cells
occupy 20% of the CPU area, and the area occupied by TMR cells becomes 60%
of the overall Cortex-R4 TMR chip area. So, the area occupied by TMR cells
dominates the area of combinational and macro cells consisting of 16 KB instruc-
tion and data caches each. The overhead of the TMR cells also depends on the
conguration options of the Cortex-R4 CPU. We have chosen 16KB instruction
and data caches by default. If we had chosen 32KB instruction and data caches,
the area overhead of the Cortex-R4 TMR would have been only 70% of the overall
chip area rather than 100%.
The performance comparisons are shown in Fig. 4.17. The target clock frequency
of the TMR core is about 35% less than the target CPU clock frequency of the
original Cortex-R4.82 Chapter 4 Soft Errors and Radiation Hardening By Design
Figure 4.12: Total Average Power and Peak Power Consumptions - 1) The
default core, 2) The core with the jack- of-all-trades Flip-Flop, 3) The core
with the TMR Flip-Flop, 4) The core with TMR scheme on Flip-Flops and
the Clock gating latches.
Figure 4.13: Leakage, Internal and Net Switching Power Consumptions
- 1) The default core, 2) The core with the jack- of-all-trades Flip-Flop,
3) The core with the TMR Flip-Flop, 4) The core with TMR scheme on
Flip-Flops and the Clock gating latches.
4.3 Discussion
This preliminary study investigates designing an SEU and SET tolerant ARM
Cortex-R4 CPU targeting space and avionics applications. We design it by trip-
licating all ip-ops at the gate-level. In this way, the micro-architecture of the
Cortex-R4 CPU is not modied and as this has the advantage of using a provenChapter 4 Soft Errors and Radiation Hardening By Design 83
Figure 4.14: Area Comparisons in Total - 1) The default core, 2) The core
with the jack- of-all-trades Flip-Flop, 3) The core with the TMR Flip-Flop,
4) The core with TMR scheme on Flip-Flops and the Clock gating latches.
CPU product with no software/tools change required. We have measured the
overheads of the SEU and SET tolerant Cortex-R4 with respect to the original
Cortex-R4. The SEU/SET tolerant Cortex-R4 occupies twice the chip area as the
Cortex-R4 with 40% total dynamic power overhead, and its target clock frequency
is about 35% less than the target CPU clock frequency of the original Cortex-R4.
The results of this study demonstrate that by triplicating all of the ip-ops at
gate-level we can deliver radiation protection for mission-critical systems. There
is always a trade-o between how much we would want the system to be SET-
tolerant versus how much of performance degradation we can aord. Because the
SET coverage of our scheme depends on temporal redundancy, the amount of the
delay elements is the key factor in determining the SET-immunity. More immunity
to SET-induced errors can be achieve at the cost of decreased performance.
Table 4.1 compares the availability and possible applications of our TMR scheme
with the most discussed schemes in the literature. These comparisons are like-for-
like.
There are various radiation-hardened processors in the literature. Table 4.2 com-
pares our TMR core with some of the published radiation hardened processor84 Chapter 4 Soft Errors and Radiation Hardening By Design
Figure 4.15: Area Comparisons in more Details I - 1) The default core, 2)
The core with the jack- of-all-trades Flip-Flop, 3) The core with the TMR
Flip-Flop, 4) The core with TMR scheme on Flip-Flops and the Clock
gating latches.
Table 4.1: Availability and Applications of Conventional Radiation Hard-
ening Schemes
Rad-Hard Scheme Architectural changes Availability Application
Gate-level TMR Not required No down-time mission-critical
System-level TMR Minor No down-time mission-critical
Lockstepping Moderate low down-time 24x7 applications
RMT Moderate low down-time 24x7 applications
Pair-and-spare High very low down-time 24x7 applications
designs in the literature which they have also published their performance degra-
dations. The performance degradations in Table 4.2 are as they reported in their
published works.
One of the major benets of gate-level TMR is the encapsulation of modications
at gate-level. This means that there are no architectural modications and no
changes in instructions and software programming. Such TMR system will always
be in 'available' mode and the performance degradation will be due the TMR ip-
ops and the majority voting circuits. System-level TMR will have approximately
the same performance degradation, however the area and power overheads willChapter 4 Soft Errors and Radiation Hardening By Design 85
Figure 4.16: Area Comparisons in more Details II - 1) The default core, 2)
The core with the jack- of-all-trades Flip-Flop, 3) The core with the TMR
Flip-Flop, 4) The core with TMR scheme on Flip-Flops and the Clock
gating latches.
Figure 4.17: Performance Comparisons - 1) The default core, 2) The core
with the jack- of-all-trades Flip-Flop, 3) The core with the TMR Flip-Flop,
4) The core with TMR scheme on Flip-Flops and the Clock gating latches.
be at least 200% comparing to a non-TMR system as every component will be
triplicated. The benet of system-level TMR is the simplicity of implementation86 Chapter 4 Soft Errors and Radiation Hardening By Design
Table 4.2: Rad-Hard CPUs and their performance overheads
Rad-Hard Core Name Architecture Performance Degradation
ARM Cortex-R4 TMR (Ours) 32-bit ARMv7 35%
Phillips-Maxwell SBC-ATIM [131] 32-bit RISC 20%-40%
Honeywell RH-32 [132] 32-bit RISC 30%
Leon II Rad-hard [133] 32-bit RISC 40%
TI Radhard VC33 [134] 32-bit RISC 30%
as there will be three separate exact replicas of the system and there is no need to
modify the implementation of the cores, although a wrapper circuit will be needed
to connect the outputs of the replicated cores to the comparators.
In lock-stepping [135] [136], which is DMR by denition (with all the area-power
overheads of a DMR system), redundant data are usually run on two identical
but separate processors and the processor cores must have the exact same state in
each cycle. These two cores will share the same inputs and the core are locked and
synchronized cycle-by-cycle. In the event of a fault on one processor core, that
core will be isolated and the other core will continue working while the faulty core
is xed or replaced. This decreases the availability of such scheme and makes it
unsuitable for mission-critical applications.
Redundant Multi-threading (RMT) [102] [103], is similar to lock-stepping with
the dierence that in RMT, output comparison and input replication occur at
the committed instruction stage, hence relaxing the cycle-by-cycle synchroniza-
tion that is required in lock-stepping. Because outputs are only compared at the
committing stage, the input replication mechanism of RMT becomes complex.
Pair-and-spare [137] [19], is basically a hybrid DMR system with RMT or lock-
stepping mechanisms to detect faults. A pair-and-spare system is comprised of
two pairs. The primary and secondary pair. Each pair is a DMR system by
itself. The spare pair is always up-to-date since it receives continuous updates
from the primary pair. This helps to make sure that the spare pair can replace
the primary pair and resume the execution from any point where the primary
pair failed. Obviously this can become very expensive in terms of overheads and
architectural modications.
Thus each radiation-hardening scheme has its own advantages, draw-backs and
applications. In the next chapter we will discuss why TMR systems are suitable for
mission-critical but short-term operations while other fault-tolerant mechanismsChapter 4 Soft Errors and Radiation Hardening By Design 87
that we discussed are more suitable for long-term operations with the penalty of
probable sporadic down-times.88 Chapter 4 Soft Errors and Radiation Hardening By Design
4.4 SEU-Tolerant Flip-Flop Design
In this section, we present a novel SEU-Tolerant Flip-Flop design. The main
dierence between our proposed design and other detection & recovery methods,
which are typically based on the TMR concept is that our design is based on DMR.
This obviously imposes less area and power overheads on the design. Conventional
DMR methods can only detect errors with no recovery. However the presented
method can detect and recover from SEU errors.
During any given clock cycle, the two ip-ops in a DMR scheme shown in Fig.
4.18 should hold the same value. If during any given clock cycle an SEU occurs
on one of the ip-ops, the comparator compares the ip-op outputs and detects
the mismatch. But it cannot determine which one of the two ip-ops is hit by
the particle. Hence error recovery is not possible. But the fact is that during any
given clock cycle and right before the SEU occurrence and the mismatch between
the outputs, both ip-ops were holding the correct value as depicted in Fig. 4.19.
We exploit this fact and propose the SEU-Tolerant scheme depicted in Fig. 4.20.
The timing diagram of the proposed scheme is shown in Fig. 4.21.
Figure 4.18: Dual-Module-Redundancy (DMR)
In SEU-free situations, the XOR output is always low and the active-low latch is
transparent. The delayed version of the output from either of the ip-ops passes
through the active-low transparent latch to the main output. By the time a particle
hits one of the ip-ops and causes an SEU, the XOR goes High indicating the
mismatch and it closes the latch. Since the latch is fed by the delayed version of
one of the ip-ops (the amount of the delay is greater than the XOR propagation
delay), the latch always closes on the correct value (the value before the SEU
occurrence) and holds it. Therefore the main output remains unchanged and
always correct.Chapter 4 Soft Errors and Radiation Hardening By Design 89
Figure 4.19: DMR Timing Diagram
Figure 4.20: Proposed SEU-Tolerant Scheme - DMR with Error Recovery.
In other words, the latch is in transparent mode all the time behaving as a combi-
national gate and it is only in state-holding mode during an SEU occurrence. The
advantage of such a circuit is that even if a particle hits the latch in any given
clock cycle, it can only cause a glitch on the main output, because the latch is in
transparent mode and not holding any state. This also means that, if in any give
clock cycle, two particles strike the module, in such a way that the latch is hit rst
and one of the ip-ips is hit next, again the circuit can recover from the error,
because the latch will close on the second particle hit and stores the correct value
but with a glitch on the main output caused by the rst particle hit.
The scheme has been implemented at transistor-level and gate-level for more accu-
rate analysis. The proposed scheme can also be implemented at register-transfer
level; however care should be taken at the place & route stage to reduce charge
sharing and collecting between the sensitive nodes in a DMR/TMR sequential
cell [138], [94]. It is also noteworthy to mention that the RTL implementation
can complicate the timing issues by placing the storage elements of a DMR/TMR90 Chapter 4 Soft Errors and Radiation Hardening By Design
Figure 4.21: DMR with Error Recovery Timing Diagram - In the occur-
rence of an SEU, the latch closes on the correct value (the region under
the oval), thus the main output is always correct.
sequential cell too far from each other, hence complicating the clock network syn-
thesis in the place & route stage.
We have used 65nm general purpose TSMC standard cells, and assumed a 600
MHz clock frequency in the following results. The total number of transistors
for the proposed ip-op implementation is 70 compared to an equivalent TMR
sequential cell (that is comprised of three ip-ops and the majority voting circuit
implemented using the standard cells with the same cell size and driving strength)
that contains 101 transistors. On average there is 38% less power overhead and
25% less area overhead because it can be implemented with fewer transistors and
gates compared to a TMR sequential cell. The comparisons are depicted in Fig.
4.22.
The delay overhead in the TMR cell is due to the majority voting circuit which
is comprised of three 2-input AND gates and one 3-input OR gate in our im-
plementation. The propagation delay for the TMR ip-op cell is the sum of
TClock-to-Q (of a none-TMR-Flip-Flop) + TMajority-Voter + TInterconnects, while the propaga-
tion delay for the DMR with recovery cell is the sum of TClock-to-Q (of a none-TMR-Flip-Flop)
+ T(delay-element + latch(D-to-Q)) + TInterconnects. The delay overhead in the DMR with
recovery scheme is caused by the delay element and the latch. There is a 10%
increase in the Clock-to-Q delay on average compared to the TMR cell, as shown
in Fig. 4.22(b). This delay can be reduced by using smaller delay elements and
faster latches or totally redesigning and characterizing the DMR cell as a new cell
and adding it to the cell library.Chapter 4 Soft Errors and Radiation Hardening By Design 91
(a) Power Comparisons
(b) Area & Delay Comparisons
Figure 4.22: Power, area & delay comparisons between two radiation-
hardened sequential cells: a TMR cell vs. the proposed DMR with Recov-
ery cell92 Chapter 4 Soft Errors and Radiation Hardening By Design
To validate the SEU immunity of the proposed scheme, transistor-level simulations
have been used for statistical SEU-fault injection. An example case is shown in
Fig. 4.23. SEUs have been injected into either of the two ip-ops at dierent
times during a given clock cycle in 10K Monte-Carlo runs to achieve a high level
of condence in the results. The results show that the proposed scheme can
statistically detect 100% of SEU errors and recover from 99.1% of SEU errors.
In less than 1% of cases, the SEU occurs right at the rising edge of the clock,
in such a way that of one of the ip-ops does not have any chance to store the
input value. In this case, the XOR gate goes high right on the rising edge of the
clock indicating the error, but depending on which ip-op the particle hits, the
main output can be correct or incorrect. In these cases, if the ip-op connected
to the delay element is not the struck one, the main output is still correct, since
the latch was fed by this ip-op and closes on the occurrence of the SEU, but
because of the mismatch in the XOR inputs, the error signal goes high and the
output is considered faulty. We can also use the same methodology to design
radiation hardened latches. We will present a specic technique for latches in the
next section.
4.5 Radiation-Hardening and Clock-Gating De-
sign
One of the most important issues that is usually ignored in radiation-hardening at
gate-level is the radiation susceptibility of the low-power design techniques such
as clock-gating. To save power, the clock signal is gated with an enable signal, in
such a way that, when the ip-op is holding its previous state and should not get
updated, the clock will be disabled by the enable signal.
Conventional clock gating schemes use a latch to provide a glitch-free gated-clock
to a number of ip-ops, as depicted in Fig. 4.24. This imposes more state-holding
elements to the design with the same radiation susceptibility as the ip-ops. A
particle hit on one of these clock-gating latches can create an SEU on the latch,
that can eventually disregards the required enable signal status and update (or
avoid updating) the stored values of the ip-ops during the clock cycle in which
the ip-ops must hold their previous values (or get updated).
The conventional solution is to use a TMR scheme on the clock-gating latches.
This imposes a 3.2x overhead in terms of area and power, plus the performanceChapter 4 Soft Errors and Radiation Hardening By Design 93
Figure 4.23: SPICE-level simulation. Despite one of the ip-op outputs
q1 being almost destroyed due to an SEU, the main output -out is still
correct.
overhead due to the existence of the majority voting circuit. Since the clock-gating
is a special case, an alternative hardening technique is our proposed SEU-tolerant
clock-gating scheme as shown in Fig. 4.25. A conventional TMR clock gating
scheme uses three latches with the majority voting circuit. In our case, using the
65nm standard cell library, a TMR clock-gating latch contains 65 transistors. How-
ever the proposed scheme can be implemented using 27 transistors. This imposes
less than 50% area-power overhead compared to the TMR version. Moreover there
is no considerable delay overhead, because it does not have any majority voting94 Chapter 4 Soft Errors and Radiation Hardening By Design
Figure 4.24: Conventional clock-gating scheme.
circuit.
Figure 4.25: Proposed SEU-tolerant clock-gating scheme
The proposed clock-gating scheme is comprised of two active-high latches & one
3-input AND gate as depicted in Fig. 4.25. Two dierent scenarios exists:
￿ Scenario 1: The SEU occurs when the Enable signal must be '0': Due to the
fact that the controlling value on the AND gate is '0', therefore even an SEU
on of the latches, changing '0' to '1' does not have any impact. This scheme
guarantees that no SEU can activate the gated-clock signal and therefore in
100% of cases when the enable signal should be '0' it will remain '0', and
an SEU on any of the latches cannot corrupt the ip-op data by unwanted
activation of the gated-clock signal \CLK-G" as shown in Fig. 4.26(a).
￿ Scenario 2: The SEU occurs when the Enable signal must be '1': Since the
controlling value on the AND gate is '0', any SEU on one of the latches can
ip '1' to '0'. This causes the clock-gated signal \CLK-G" connected to theChapter 4 Soft Errors and Radiation Hardening By Design 95
ip-ops to have a narrower high phase, depending on the time that the SEU
occurs during any given clock cycle Fig. 4.26(b). Our Spice-level simulations
using 65nm technology show that only in less than 1% of cases this can lead
to a data corruption on the ip-op. For instance, in a worst case scenario,
where the SEU occurs right at the rising edge of the clock signal in such a
way that the gated-clock signal will be just a very narrow pulse looking like
a glitch Fig. 4.27, but the ip-op still gets updated properly.
(a) Scenario 1: SEU when Enable signal must be 0
(b) Scenario 2: SEU when Enable signal must be 1
Figure 4.26: Timing Diagram for the proposed SEU-tolerant clock-gating
scheme
Note that our scope in this section was focused on the RHBD clock gating. The
ip-ops connected to this scheme need their own radiation hardening protection.
Table 4.3 summarizes the suitability of our proposed DMR-with-recovery scheme
for dierent applications. As mentioned earlier, the notion of 99.1% SEU immunity
is based on the statistical SEU injection during a given clock cycle. The Achilles'
heel of this schemes falls into the 1% vulnerability that an SEU error cannot
be corrected. Hence this scheme is not suitable for mission-critical or safety-
critical applications in which data integrity, or system availability at 100% level96 Chapter 4 Soft Errors and Radiation Hardening By Design
Figure 4.27: SEU-tolerant clock-gating scheme: A worst case scenario -
The clock signal is almost destroyed by the SEU, but the ip-op still gets
updated properly but with a bit longer clock-to-q delay.
of condence is a must (Although even with TMR, there can never be a 100%
level of condence as a simultaneous particle strike on two out of three of the
ip-ops can corrupt the majority voter output). Apart from this, due to the
performance overheads, our DMR-with-recovery scheme may not be suitable for
non-critical but ultra-high-speed applications such as switches or web-servers. If
resetting the system can be tolerated, then our scheme can be used in back-end
databases systems and low-end web-servers due to the fact that our during that
1% timing window in which an SEU event cannot be correct, still the SEU event
will be detected so by restarting the core or ushing the pipe-line, the system will
be able to recover from such a fault.
Table 4.3: Applications
Applications Data integrity Availability DMR-with-recovery scheme
Mission-critical Critical Critical Not Suitable
Web-server Moderate High Only Suitable for low-end market
Backend - database High Moderate Only Suitable for low-end market
Desktop low low Suitable
Mobile low low SuitableChapter 4 Soft Errors and Radiation Hardening By Design 97
4.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter addresses the third objective \To investigate timing vulnerability
of UDSM sequential circuits and state-holding elements and propose a possible
hardening-by-design solution". In this chapter we discussed the implementation
of a radiation hardened processor core using our proposed TMR-based ow for the
state holding elements such as ip-ops and clock-gating latches. The results show
that the area-power overhead on average is less than 100% for such schemes. It is
also noteworthy to mention that care should be taken when it comes to the layout
design of such TMR cells and the placement of sensitive nodes should be done in
such a way that redundant element (sensitive nodes in a ip-op) should be placed
far enough from one another to avoid an SEU on two store holding elements in
one TMR ip-op.
We have also presented a novel technique at gate level to design radiation-hardened
sequential cells. The approach taken is based on DMR with error recovery, and
results in 30% less area and power overhead compared to TMR sequential cells.
We also presented a novel technique for a radiation-hardened clock gating scheme
which results in less than 50% area and power overheads, plus no performance
overhead comparing to the TMR version. Since we use conventional standard cell
libraries and EDA tools to apply these techniques, no additional modication or
custom libraries or tools are needed. Our SPICE-level simulations show that these
methods are statistically able to recover from 99% of SEU errors.
Some of the results of the work in this chapter have been published as:
￿ M.M. Ghahroodi; M. Zwolinski; E. Ozer, "Radiation hardening by design:
A novel gate level approach," Adaptive Hardware and Systems (AHS), 2011
NASA/ESA Conference on , vol., no., pp.74,79, 6-9 June 2011
￿ M.M. Ghahroodi; E. Ozer; D. Bull, "SEU and SET-tolerant ARM Cortex-R4
CPU for Space and Avionics Applications", MEDIAN'13, The Second Work-
shop on Manufacturable and Dependable Multicore Architectures at Nanoscale,
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Reliability and In-eld Logic
Repair
Ultra Deep-Sub-Micron CMOS chips have to function correctly and reliably not
only during their early post-fabrication life, but also for their entire life span. In
this chapter, we present an idea at architectural level to deal with this. In the case
of any permanent faults, logic spare-blocks will replace the faulty blocks on the
y. Meanwhile by shutting down the main logic blocks partial threshold voltage
recovery can be achieved which will alleviate the ageing-related delay impacts and
timing issues. The proposed technique can avoid fatal shut-downs in the system
and will decrease the down-time, hence the availability of such systems will be
preserved. We have implemented the proposed idea on a pipe-lined processor
core using conventional ASIC design ow. The simulation results show that by
tolerating about 70% area overhead and less than 18% power overhead we can
dramatically increase the reliability and decrease the downtime of the processor.
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present a technique to retain the functionality of CMOS circuits
and processors in the occurrence of any reliability issues that can lead to permanent
faults, while keeping the overheads reasonable. We evaluate the reliability of the
proposed techniques using Markov models and NASA SURE reliability tool. We
also apply the technique to tackle timing and delay faults due to process variation
or ageing impacts.
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Various reliability factors such as safety and robustness as well as resilience to
malfunctions need to be addressed in dependable systems [139] [140]. Infrastruc-
ture systems such as internet, banks, stock market, the electric power networks,
etc. require dependability to ensure social stability and in many cases this must
be 24 h, 365 days. Providing this level of dependability and availability and mak-
ing reliable electronic systems out of unreliable CMOS components while keeping
overheads as low as possible is a major challenge today.
To increase the reliability of systems, various fault-tolerant techniques based on
redundancy in time/spatial domains are being used. As for hardware-based re-
dundancy: majority voting redundancy (TMR), stand-by redundancy and hybrid
modular redundancy (HMR) are the major techniques. It is generally believed
that N-modular redundancy systems are more reliable than, say, stand-by redun-
dancy systems. For instance, the reliability of an N-modular redundancy system
such as TMR with three redundant components (with equal reliability R for each




2(1   R) =  2R
3 + 3R
2[21] (5.1)
On the other hand, the reliability of stand-by redundancy systems with two re-
dundant components (with equal reliability R for each component and assuming
that fault-detection coverage is 100%) can generally be expressed as:
Rstand by = R
2 + 2R(1   R) =  R
2 + 2R[21] (5.2)
As depicted in Fig 5.1, mathematically speaking, the reliability of stand-by redun-
dancy systems is higher that the reliability of TMR systems for all R. However this
can be a tricky comparison. Because the TMR systems have higher fault-detection
coverage with the feature of data comparison by nature, and higher reliability es-
pecially for shorter t. Therefore, the TMR systems are widely used for ultimate
safety systems for life-critical applications with relatively shorter mission time.
Also the overheads of TMR systems particularity in terms of power consumption
are extremely high.Chapter 5 Reliability and In-eld Logic Repair 101
Figure 5.1: Reliability Comparisons
5.2 In-Field Repair in CMOS Circuit Design
5.2.1 Motivation
As mentioned in chapter 2, reliability issues such as Aging, Time-Dependent Di-
electric Breakdown (TDDB), transistor, Hot-Carrier Injection (HCI) and Negative
Bias Temperature Instability (NBTI) degradations are inevitable in the ultra deep-
sub-micron era and each can signicantly aect system MTBF. These phenomena
can manifest themselves as performance degradation, timing errors or hard-errors
in the chip, leading to a total failure of the processor permanently [141].
Here the challenge is increasing the maintainability of a system or a circuit, com-
prised of CMOS devices, once a malfunction is detected. Since these major relia-
bility issues are inevitable by nature, therefore the goal is decreasing the downtime
hence the MTTR of such systems. An overlooked fact is that the \MTBF Count-
down Clock" does not start until the device is under stress i.e. the hardware is
powered up. In other words, device degradation does not happen if the devices are
permanently \o" because there is no electrical eld in the transistor channels;
hence electrons will not become energetic or "hot" enough to damage the channel
oxide interface (causing HCI) and there will not be any high vertical electrical eld
in the channel at high temperatures (causing NBTI) for instance.102 Chapter 5 Reliability and In-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Moreover as reported in [10] [62] and as illustrated in [63] [64] and [10], some of
the impacts of the aforementioned reliability issues such as the threshold voltage
shifts in CMOS devices can be recovered to their original values by removing
the stress from the devices and turning them o. For instance, in [142], the
measurements of NBTI performance degradation of a processor core at 90nm have
been demonstrated in which, due to NBTI stress for a duration of approximately
1000s, there is a frequency shift of about 0.2%. By removing the NBTI stress i.e.
the voltage from the core ring oscillator, a recovery of about 0.1% which is about
50% of the frequency shift has been observed .
On the other hand, silicon is still the most commercially used material for inte-
grated circuits because it is cheap and readily available. Taking all these facts
into account, we propose an idea for logic in-eld repair to avoid incidents such as
fatal shut-down in processors and to increase the availability factor by providing
logic spare-blocks using within-chip cold swapping. Our scope will be on the logic
parts of a design rather than the memory blocks such as RAM cells, since we can
protect the memory blocks using available ECC methods.
In the next section we present an architectural solution for increasing the reliability
of processors using logic spare-blocks. Here the key point is trading area for
reliability and trying to keep the power and the performance overheads as low as
possible while keeping the processor running even in the occurrence of a permanent
fault.
5.2.2 In-Field Logic Repair
Hard-errors and defects that disable the system from executing its applications
can be fatal if the whole system shuts down. In case a set of failures disables the
system from carrying out all applications, a subset of less important applications
can be dropped while the more important applications can be kept alive. This
concept is known as graceful degradation [143] [144]. The main idea is providing
logic spare-blocks to the architecture in such a way that in the occurrence of any
permanent faults or defects, the faulty logic block can be replaced by the spare-
block as depicted in Fig. 5.2 to maintain the same functionality or with graceful
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5.2.3 Sphere of Replication and Levels of Granularity
The sphere of replication determines the logical boundary within which logic blocks
are physically replicated. The size and the level of granularity of the sphere of
replication can vary widely, and this level of granularity will lead to implementation
complexity vs. availability trade-os. A spare-block can vary from a simple logic
gate to a whole processor core; a spare-block can be an exact replica of a logic
block or a functionally equivalent structure of that logic block but with a dierent
canonical form or physical implementation.
Figure 5.2: General idea of logic in-eld repair: Spare logic blocks can be
exact replicas of relevant logic blocks or functionally equivalent structures,
or even a simplied version of the logic blocks with reduced functionalities.
It can be observed that about 80% of an ASIC chip uses less than 20% percent
of the available cells in a given cell library. From a Boolean logic perspective,
any arbitrary function can be implemented with 2-input NAND or NOR cells, but
for power, performance and area optimization, a variety of cells for implementing
the same logic functions are available in a given cell library. For example, any
function implemented by NAND-NOR cells can be replaced the AOI(AND-OR-
INVERT), OAI(OR-AND-INVERT) cells to save area and power, especially in
CMOS technology. Because AOI/OAI cells consumes less transistors compared
to NAND-NOR cells, this can result in lower fabrication costs. For instance, a
2-input CMOS AOI cell can be implemented by 6 transistors, comparing to the
NAND-NOR equivalent which used 10 transistors. Therefore, any given logic block
can be implemented using dierent cell varieties, all having the same functions.
A spare-block can also be a simplied version of a certain logic block that is smaller
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a permanent fault or defect on the main logic block rather than failing completely.
In other words, the spare-blocks can also be designed to be used in the graceful
degradation phase if any permanent fault or defect happens.
Obviously the easiest approach could be taking the whole processor core as a
spare-block in the replication procedure. Such system would appear as a dual core
processor, with one always-o core and one always-on core. In the occurrence of a
permanent fault on such a dual core processor, the faulty core should be shut down
and the other core should be powered up. However doing this at Core-level would
cost many clock cycles due to initialization and re-execution of several instructions
while switching between spare-blocks at pipeline level would cost just a few clock
cycles hence the system would have a higher availability and lower downtime, par-
ticularly in case of safety-critical or non-stop computing applications. Therefore,
in this work, we dene the logic spare-blocks as pipeline stages in a processor core
in favour of increased availability and decreased downtime.
It is noteworthy to mention that, there is a huge dierence in power consumption
between the proposed method and N-modular redundancy methods such as DMR
or TMR. Here only the main core, the switches and the controller are always \on"
and the spare-blocks are turned on only when they are needed. By the time a
logic spare-block is turned on, its faulty/defective counterpart will be turned o
to keep the power consumption overheads as low as possible. Moreover because the
spare-blocks are always \o", they will be immune to the ageing, NBTI and HCI
impacts. The down-time for the system will also be much lower than replacing
or swapping a faulty chip with a new one, since all the replacements will happen
within the chip.
Since the switching between the logic blocks is happening in a within-chip fashion,
the delays and the downtime of such system is limited to a few clock cycles.
Therefore the reliability of such system can be considered as equal to the reliability
of stand-by redundancy systems with two redundant components. However the
power overheads of such in-eld repair system is signicantly lower that any stand-
by or TMR systems, thanks to the within-chip cold swapping mechanism.
The reliability of such in-eld repair system RIFR, with s number of spare-blocks
and Rb as the reliability of each block, whether an active block or a spare-block -
assuming that the fault detection and the switching mechanisms are awless-, can
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RIFR = 1   (1   Rb)
(s+1) (5.3)
RIFR is an increasing function of the number of spare-blocks. However too many
spare-blocks can have a detrimental eect on the reliability of such a system,
accompanied by intolerable overheads. Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 show an example
of the reliability of the IFR system, once assuming block reliability of 1, and
increasing the number of spare blocks and another time assuming block reliability
of 0.7, and increasing the number of spare blocks (assuming awless fault detection
and switching mechanisms). In an ideal world, that the spare blocks are 100%
reliable, increasing the number of spare block only adds up to the overhead by
100%. In more practical cases, there is a tradeo between the level of reliability
and the amount of overhead that can be tolerated.
Table 5.1
Number of spare-blocks Reliability of blocks Reliability of IFR Overhead
1 1 1 100%
2 1 1 200%
3 1 1 300%
4 1 1 400%
5 1 1 500%
Table 5.2
Number of spare-blocks Reliability of blocks Reliability of IFR Overhead
1 0.7 0.91 100%
2 0.7 0.972 200%
3 0.7 0.9919 300%
4 0.7 0.99757 400%
5 0.7 0.999271 500%
The Markov model of such scheme can be expressed as Fig. 5.3 with F(t) as the
distribution function of reconguration transitions from a working state (2) to a
working state (3), that is after switching to spare-blocks. State (4) is the death
state that represents the total failure of the system.
To evaluate the reliability of such system a program called SURE has been used
which is released by NASA Langley Research Center. SURE is essentially a reli-
ability analysis tool that can be used to compute and solve semi-Markov models
based on SURE bounding theorem. This theorem states that: \The probabil-
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Figure 5.3: Markov model of In-Field Repair system
is bounded as: Lower-bound < D(t) < Upper-bound". The maths behind how
SURE computes these, is discussed in [145]. For this work, we are interested in
observing possibilities of the upper and the lower bounds of the main states: the
operational state and the death state.
The SURE tool is particularly useful in analyzing the fault-tolerance features of
recongurable systems. To investigate the reliability of mission-critical computer
systems, the probabilistic boundaries are computed to be close enough (usually
within 5% of each other). According the developers, even for enormous and com-
plex systems, SURE bounding theorems have algebraic solutions which are con-
sequently computationally ecient. Also, SURE can optionally take a specied
parameter as a variable over a range of values, which can automate the process of
sensitivity analysis of such systems [145].
To analyze the Markov reliability model of the system in SURE, all of the states
and the transitions between them should be dened. Usually during early analysis
of the processes of a system, there is no experimental reliability data available.
So for simplicity, we have to start with some assumptions about the not-exactly-
known issues in the process, components, mission-time and the failure rates. For
instance, let's assume a TMR system in which, each processor has the failure rate
 over the specied range of 1E-6 to 1E-2 with the mission time equal to 1000
hours.
The SURE tools calculates an upper and a lower bound on the probability of
system failure. As mentioned earlier, these bounds are usually within 5% of each
other, and thus they usually provide an accurate estimate of system failure. Fig.
5.4 shows the probability of failure of a TMR system as opposed to an IFR system
with the same failure rate  over the same specied range of 1E-6 to 1E-2 with the
same mission time equal to 1000 hours which is shown in Fig. 5.5. Because the
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plot. It can be seen that the reliability of a TMR system is strongly dependent on
the mission time and for longer mission times the IFR system is far more reliable.
Figure 5.4: NASA SURE plot for TMR systems - Mission time: 1000 hours
In the next section, we discuss the implementation and the reliability gains of the
general proposed general IFR architecture on a processor core at pipeline level.108 Chapter 5 Reliability and In-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Figure 5.5: NASA SURE plot for the proposed general In-Field Repair
system - Mission time: 1000 hours
5.2.4 In-Field Logic Repair at Pipeline Level
To minimize the reconguration process time F(t), we have implemented this idea
at pipeline level on a processor core at RTL down to GDSII using a conventional
ASIC design ow on 45nm Nanngate standard cell library. The RTL-to-GDSII
ow is similar to what we used in Chapter 4, section 4.3.
The 32 bit processor core that has been used has a 3 stage pipeline and each
pipeline stage is taken as one logic block. Pipelines stages are connected to one
another through the switch boxes. The switch boxes have been implemented
using multiplexor cells available in the standard cell library. Parity error detection
method has been used with one parity bit for every eight bits of signals between
the pipeline stages. The parity circuit has been added before the pipeline registers
for every pipeline stage. The cost of the error coding and decoding logic is typically
amortized over many bits.Chapter 5 Reliability and In-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Figure 5.6: Proposed architecture
Note that the idea is to replicate the logic parts and not the register le or any
other memory block. The memory blocks are protected by ECC which is the
conventional method in such designs. The multiplexer-based switch boxes, the
parity error detection circuits and the controller unit have been added to the core
at RTL and the power-gating circuit has been added at the place & route stage.
There is one parity bit for every eight bits of signals connecting the pipeline stages
together. Any parity error lasting for more than a certain number of clock cycles
is considered a permanent fault. Hence the faulty pipeline stage will be shut down,
the pipeline will be ushed and the spare pipeline block will be turned on by the
controller unit. The controller unit is also in charge of power management to
avoid IR drop and simultaneous switching capacitance by turning on the blocks in
a daisy chain style, hence avoiding any in-rush current. The controller has been
implemented using the two-rail checker scheme.
To implement the proposed architecture, the duplication of the pipeline stages,
switch-boxes, and the design of the controller have been done at Register Transfer
level down to gate level. The core itself is designed in VHDL, the additional
circuits such as parity circuits, the switch-boxes, the controller and the top level
les are dened in Verilog and the power gating scheme and the power switches
have been added at place & route stage.110 Chapter 5 Reliability and In-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Figure 5.7: In-eld repair architecture: Main pipeline blocks, spare-Blocks,
the switch boxes and the controller.
Figure 5.8: critical path
5.2.4.1 Switch Boxes
The switch boxes are essentially comprised of two 2  1 multiplexor cells for each
bit, Fig 5.9. They are added as a VHDL structural block and instantiated in the
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Figure 5.9: A 2-way switch for a single bit (costs: 20 transistors using
45nm cell library, almost equal to a D-ip-op in size).
5.2.4.2 Error Detection Mechanism
Parity error detection has been added before and after the pipeline registers. Every
eight bits of the registers is protected by one parity bit.
5.2.4.3 Self-Checking Controller
The controller is designed based on a duplication and comparison scheme as de-
picted in Fig 5.10. The duplicated copy of the controller has complemented output
values. The comparison is done using totally self-checking (TSC) two-rail checkers
(TRC). Both copies of the controller functions receive the same inputs.
Figure 5.10: Self-checking controller
The problem with power gating schemes is that in the real world, power switches
will not necessarily fully charge to supply power to the block or fully discharge
to cut the power from the block. So there will be an equilibrium between the
sub-threshold leakage of the power gating cell and the leakage current through the
power gating cell. This is one of the main reasons we need isolation cells on the
outputs of a block which is power gated [23]. This will help to avoid any crowbar-
style currents owing from the outputs of the power-gated block and the inputs of
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in low-power standard library cells. Each isolation cell has a control input signals
that when engaged it will prevent any crowbar current on its output regardless of
the uctuations on its input. The controller provides this isolation control signal.
To dierentiate transient faults from permanent faults, two dierent techniques
are used. 1) Adjustable counters in the controller block. Whenever there is an
error for more than certain number of clock cycles the error will be assumed to
permanent. 2) Due to the fact that transient errors are typically last for less that
a clock cycle, a cheap way of designing a fault dierentiators circuit at gate-level is
depicted in Fig. 5.11, that can easily dierentiate permanent faults from transient
faults.
For instance, four error/parity bits "ABCD" are fed to this circuit. In the occur-
rence of an error, if at least any of such bits goes high, the main error indicator
"Error" will go high for one clock cycle. This can be due to an SET or an SEU.
On the other hand, permanent faults will be more than one clock cycle, hence the
resulting Error signal will go high, and stay high for many clock cycles, indicating
that a permanent fault has occurred. This is shown in Fig. 5.12 and Fig. 5.13.
Figure 5.11: Di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Figure 5.12: Transient fault
Figure 5.13: Permanent fault
In the occurrence of any permanent delay fault in any logic block (or any pipeline
stage in our case), the controller ushes the pipeline, avoiding the ongoing instruc-
tion to commit, turns o the faulty block, turns on the spare-block and re-runs
the instruction. In this case, the system only loses a few clock cycles rather than
a longer period of time to swap the faulty chip with a new one, hence avoiding a
total shut-down of the system. The timings of this scheme are depicted in 5.14.114 Chapter 5 Reliability and In-eld Logic Repair
Figure 5.14: An example of the sequence of timings of power management
unit based on the methodology in [23]
The reliability of such an architecture is equal to:
RIFR(pipeline) = jRp
2 + 2CRp(1   Rp)jRswRctrl (5.4)
where Rp is the reliability of each logic block (pipeline stages in this case) with
C as the fault coverage factor. Rctrl is reliability of the controller and Rsw is the
reliability of the switch boxes. Here the assumption is fault coverage of 100%.
From this equation, it is obvious that Rctrl and Rsw should not be ignored and
they have key impacts on the RIFR(pipeline) as the switched and the controller will
always be online, so their reliability factors are multiplied to the whole reliability
of this system.
Fig. 5.15 shows the Markov model of this system. The system begins in state (1)
where all components are operational. Either of two processors or the switch-boxes
and the controller could fail. p is the failure rate of the currently on-line pipeline
stages that would make a whole functional core running, p is also considered for
the processor pipeline stages which are currently o-line, and sw is the failure
rate of the switch-boxes with ctrl as the failure rate of the controller. Note that
the sum of the rates of all failure transitions from state (1) add up to the sum ofChapter 5 Reliability and In-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the failure rates of all non-failed components (p + sw + ctrl). This property
should always be true for all operational states of a reliability model.
Figure 5.15: Markov model of IFR at pipeline level
5.2.5 Results
5.2.5.1 Overhead Comparisons
As shown in Fig. 5.16, the total area overhead is around 72% on this simple
core, because all the logic blocks are duplicated and the controller unit and the
switch boxes are also added. Because the spare-blocks are always kept o-line, the
dynamic power overhead is less than 18% and the leakage power overhead is 14%.
This is caused mainly by the controller unit and the switch boxes. The 9% delay
overhead is mainly caused by the error detection mechanism and the switch boxes
Fig. 5.8.
In the testing phase of the circuit, the reliability issues and ageing have been
modelled as single stuck-at faults and delay faults injected in the main pipeline
decode and execute units. The core clock frequency is 100 MHz. A pre-dened set
of instructions has been run on both of the simple core and the IFR core. Having
the same level of permanent faults in the simple core could result in the fatal
shut-down of the core, while the IFR core can get back to its normal functioning
status within approximately 1 micro second in this test as shown in Table 5.3.
Due to probable IR drop issues, and since we cannot account for dynamic IR drop
accurately, we have to be conservative, so we allowed 50 clock cycles (0.5 us) for
the power-on phase and to let the system switch to spare blocks. If the exact IR116 Chapter 5 Reliability and In-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Figure 5.16: Area, power and performance comparisons: A)Simple core
B)In-eld repair core
Design Faults Total Recovery Time (us)
IFR Core Stuck-at (Decode Unit) 0.82
IFR Core Stuck-at (Execute Unit) 1.0
IFR Core Delay (Decode Unit) 1.20
IFR Core Delay (Execute Unit 1.51
Table 5.3: IFR Core Fault Test
drop behaviour of the system is known, the recovery times in Table 5.3 will be
much quicker.
As shown in Fig. 5.17, the contribution of logic components (including all the
pipeline stages: predecode unit, decode unit and execute unit) to the total area and
power consumption is less than 40% for this specic simple core. It is noteworthy
to mention that the relative contribution of logic to the total area is decreasing
in modern processors since the sizes of on-chip memory blocks such caches are
increasing rapidly, therefore applying this technique to more realistic and modern
processors will result in a lower relative area overhead. As reported in ITRS 2011
roadmap report [24], the trend in processor chips shows that the contribution of
memory in terms of chip area is predicted to be an order of magnitude higher
than logic as shown is Fig. 5.18. This is particularly true for 90nm technology to
16nm and beyond, therefore the area overheads of the proposed technique will be
justi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Figure 5.17: Contribution of each processor pipeline stage to the total area
and power consumptions.
Figure 5.18: ITRS - Logic vs memory roadmap [24]
5.2.5.2 Reliability Comparisons
To compare the reliability of these systems, the SURE program has been used.
The probability failure of a simple core with the failure rate of  over the specied
range of 1E-6 to 1E-2 with the mission time 1000 is shown in Fig. 5.19. Using
the same failure rate  and the same mission time, the graph in Fig. 5.20 shows
that the probability failure of the IFR system is much lower than that of the
simplex core particularly for components with higher failure rates 's. In other
words, for components/processors with higher failure rates, a simplex system has
a higher probability to fail within the given mission time as opposed to an IFR-like
system. Also considering the given range of 1E-6 to 1E-2 for the failure rates, the
probability failure of a simple core starts with 0.001 while the probability failure
of the IFR version of the core starts at 1E-6. For failure rates of around  = 0.001,118 Chapter 5 Reliability and In-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the probability failure of the simple core is very close to 1, however for the IFR
core it is approximately 0.3. It can be seen that the IFR core is far more reliable
at any failure rates, of course at the cost of tolerating minor power-performance
overheads and considerable area overheads.
Figure 5.19: NASA SURE plot for probability failure of the simple core
5.3 Challenges in Static Timing Analysis of our
proposed schemes
The work in this chapter was an attempt to assess the feasibility of the proposed
in-eld repair architectures. Care should be taken in Static Timing Analysis (STA)
of such architectures as this can be challenging. This is due to the fact that the
main blocks and the main timing paths and the spare blocks and spare timing
paths do not necessarily age linearly or at exactly the same rates. This means
that switching to spare-blocks can cause new hold time violations at run-time, as
some paths in a spare-block can be faster than their counterparts in the main-
block. These new hold time violations can be deadly to the system functionality
just like any other hold time violations in a fully synchronous design. Therefore
hold time robustness is a must in such scheme. To address this, two criteria should
be specically considered in functional STA:Chapter 5 Reliability and In-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Figure 5.20: NASA SURE plot for probability failure of the IFR core
￿ Hold check of the design in all of the following modes: All of the main-blocks,
all of the spare-blocks and all of the combinations of the main blocks and
the spare blocks.
￿ Addition of extra hold margins on the top hold-time violating paths for all
the modes mentioned above.
Therefore the drawback of such architecture is that it creates extra timing scenarios
in the order of 2n with n being the number of the blocks that have spare-block
backups in the design. In other words, the functional mode in STA will not be
only one mode anymore and it will be expanded to 2n modes.
For instance, for our proposed in-eld repair scheme on the 3-stage pipe-lined
processor, n would be the number the pipe-line stages, hence all of the modes,
should be analyzed in STA as shown in Table 5.4.
The deeper the pipe-line in a processor is, the more timing scenarios will be created
which must be checked specially in terms of hold time violations, so this can be
seen as an overhead at design time.120 Chapter 5 Reliability and In-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Table 5.4: STA Scenarios of the in-eld repair scheme in functional modes
with n=3 leading to 8 functional modes
Functional Timing Scenarios Pre-decode Decode Execute
Scenario 1 Main block Main block Main block
Scenario 2 Main block Spare block Main block
Scenario 3 Main block Main block Spare block
Scenario 4 Main block Spare block Spare block
Scenario 5 Spare block Main block Main block
Scenario 6 Spare block Spare block Main block
Scenario 7 Spare block Main block Spare block
Scenario 8 Spare block Spare block Spare block
5.4 Variation-and-Ageing Resilient Design
It is also possible to take the idea of section 5.4, but instead of applying it to the
whole core, the replication happens only on the critical paths in a design. In other
words, besides the main group of the critical paths in a design, spare-paths also
exist which are kept o-line. This is shown in Fig. 5.21. In the occurrence of any
permanent delay-fault due to variation or ageing, instead of a total shut-down of
the whole circuit or even slowing it down, we only swap the failed critical path
with its spare-path.
Figure 5.21: Variation-and-ageing resilient design
From the variation point of view, this technique can even increase the yield. At
the post-fabrication testing stage, the fastest critical paths can be switched on as
the main operating paths among the available spare-paths. The overhead of such
scheme is minimal, since only the critical paths are replicated (depending on the
number of replications). The additional area and power consumption overheads
will be due to the power switches and a controller, very similar to the aforemen-
tioned in-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Also, as addressed in [10] and [62], some of the impacts of the aforementioned reli-
ability issues such as delays and threshold voltage shifts can be recovered to their
original values. Therefore, during normal operation of the circuit, the threshold
voltages of shut-down devices in the turned-o blocks can partially recover to their
initial values when the gate bias is switched to 0V. Therefore a partial Vth recovery
can also be achieved that can alleviate the probability of any delay faults if the
initially used critical paths are needed to be turned on again due to ageing-induced
delay faults in the secondary group of critical paths.
Hence ideally, the Markov model of such a system can be expressed as Fig. 5.22.
We can model the threshold voltage recovery rate with  which is the repair rate.
F(t) is the function of reconguration transitions from a working state (2) to a
working state (3), that is after switching to spare-critical paths due to ageing-
related delay faults in the main group of critical paths.
Figure 5.22: Markov model of Variation-and-Ageing Resilient Design
Note that the model in Fig. 5.22 contains a loop because of the repair rate, that
is a path that returns to the rst state. Loops can lead to innitely long paths.
In theory, evaluating such models will take forever unless a safety value is used.
The SURE tools assesses such models using loop truncation automatically. The
default truncation level is 25, which will not be reached in most models. The
mathematical basis for loop truncation in SURE is given in [145]. The reliability
plot of a simple design is the same as Fig. 5.19 and Fig. 5.23 shows the reliability
plot of the proposed scheme.
To investigate the overheads of the proposed scheme, a group critical paths from
the core has been taken. This group of critical paths has been replicated three
times. In other words, each of these critical paths has two replicas, ready and kept
o-line. The delay overhead of a such scheme is equal to the proposed in-eld122 Chapter 5 Reliability and In-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Figure 5.23: NASA SURE plot for probability failure of variation-and-
ageing resilient design
repair structure however the area and power overheads are dramatically lower as
depicted in Fig. 5.24.
Figure 5.24: Area, power and performance comparisons: A)Simple core
B)Variation-and-ageing resilient design core
It is also noteworthy to mention that having dierent implementations of the criti-
cal paths result in dierent delay variations. For instance, our Monte Carlo simula-
tions at transistor level show that using AND-OR-Invert (AOI) & OR-AND-Invert
(OAI) cells to implement the critical paths gives the lowest standard deviation forChapter 5 Reliability and In-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delay variations but the highest mean delay as opposed to NAND-NOR imple-
mentations of the same paths. This is shown in Fig. 5.25. The delay distribution
for AOI/OAI and NAND-NOR circuits is more normal than the default library
versions as depicted in the QQ plots in Fig. 5.26. This was observed by running
10k transistor level Monte Carlo simulations adding 10% to 25% variation to the
threshold voltages of the transistors in the critical paths. Therefore, by implement-
ing the spare-critical paths using dierent cell types (and at the cost of greater
mean delays), enhanced Normality, and therefore better variation predictability
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5.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter addresses the last objective \To investigate aging and the reliability
issues of UDSM circuits and processors and propose an in-eld repair mechanism
to avoid fatal shut-downs". In this chapter a logic in-eld repair technique for
UDSM CMOS processor design has been presented. Here the argument is that
the \MTBF Countdown Clock" does not start until the device is under stress (i.e.
the hardware is powered up) and device degradation does not happen if the devices
are permanently \o". Therefore by trading area for increased reliability and by
providing spare-logic blocks which are normally o (and will be turned on in case
a logic block loses its functionality), any fatal shut-down will be prevented.
We have implemented the proposed technique on a pipe-lined processor core using
the conventional ASIC design ow. The simulation results show that by tolerating
about 70% area overhead and less than 18% power overhead we can dramatically
increase the reliability and decrease the downtime of the processor. As this area
overhead is purely logic based, and as trends in microprocessors indicate that
logic will require less than one tenth of the silicon area of future chips the area
overheads of the proposed technique will be justiable. The reliability benets of
our proposed architecture have been assessed using Markov models and the NASA
SURE reliability analysis tool. The results show that, using the proposed technique
the reliability is increased by a factor of x10 to x100 for various component failure
rates.
In addition, replication can be applied to only on a select group of critical paths to
improve the system's resilience towards variation and ageing-induced delay faults.
In turned-o blocks the threshold voltage can partially recover due to the 0V gate
bias and this can alleviate the probability of any delay faults if the used logic-
blocks or the group of critical-paths are needed to be turned on again due to the
same ageing-induced delay faults in the secondary spare-blocks or the secondary




Figure 5.25: Delay distribution of three dierent scenarios of implementing




Figure 5.26: Normal distribution predictability of three dierent scenarios




This thesis provides a survey of various UDSM impacts on circuits and devices,
reviewing the ongoing research and providing a summary of the state-of-the-art
techniques to mitigate the UDSM impacts.
We have proposed a method to determine the minimum capturable pulse width
for the sequential cells which will lead to a more realistic SER computation. As
suggested in the literature, the pulse-width of the most common SETs increases
for the same radiation environment with technology scaling and demonstrate the
increasing importance of combinational logic soft errors. Considering this assump-
tion for 45nm technology and below, there is a high chance of transient pulses being
captured by the ip-ops, because the WOV is very narrow at UDSM. For the
130nm technology the minimum captured pulse width is 65 ps. For the 90nm
technology, the narrowest capturable pulse is observed to be 56 ps and the nar-
rowest capturable pulse width at 45nm is approximately 34 ps. These values are
much less than the dened setup/hold time values in the cell library data-sheets.
The results also show that, at 45nm, even in the presence of process variation,
the ip-ops are still very susceptible to narrow pulses. Moreover, in circuits with
GHZ clock frequencies, this can even lead to multiple bit errors rather than the
conventional expectation of single-bit soft errors.
We also observed that interconnect capacitance plays an important role in masking
the transient pulses and reducing the SER. Our simulations show that certain
amount of capacitance at the output of the struck node attens the transient
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pulse and reduces the pulse amplitude in such a way that the transient pulse
cannot be sensed by the next combinational or sequential gate. For instance, our
simulations show that for typical 45 nm technology a load capacitance of greater
than 20 fF at the output of the struck node attens the SET. Here the problem is
that the exact amount of interconnect capacitance is not available before the place
& route stage. For a more realistic calculation of SER, we should also consider
interconnect capacitance.
Soft errors induced by radiation, causing malfunctions in electronic systems and
circuits, have become one of the most challenging issues that impact the reliability
of the modern processors even for sea-level applications. We have presented an
implementation of a radiation-hardened 32-bit pipelined processor as well as two
novel radiation-hardening techniques at gate-level. We obtained a single-event-
upset (SEU) tolerant ip-op design with 38% less power overhead and 25% less
area overhead at 65nm technology comparing to conventional Triple Modular Re-
dundancy (TMR).
To increase the reliability, availability, and lifetime of next-generation circuits, new
methods for in-eld repair or design for repair or self-healing should be investi-
gated. In each of the cases, an in-eld graceful repair action takes place after a
mechanism for detecting faults. For general logic circuits, a variety of techniques
may be used. In all cases, however, detection of an error requires that some defen-
sive action needs to be taken to recover. This recovery could simply be a graceful
shutdown. Hence, a checker and controller is needed.
We have proposed an approach for in-eld logic repair. The key idea is trading
area for reliability by adding logic in-eld repair features to the system while
keeping the power and the performance overheads as low as possible. In the case
of any permanent faults, logic spare-blocks will replace the faulty blocks on the
y. We have implemented the proposed idea on a pipelined processor core using
the conventional ASIC design ow. The simulation results show that by tolerating
about 70% area overhead and less than 18% power overhead we can dramatically
increase the reliability and decrease the downtime of the processor. The results
show that, using the proposed technique the reliability can be increased by a factor
of x10 to x100 for various component failure rates.Chapter 6 Conclusions 129
6.2 Future work
Technology scaling has resulted in signicant variation between wafers and dies,
as well as increasing levels of within-die variation. This makes the simulation and
the analysis of temporal masking to be very dicult. More broadly, increasing
variation has complicated accurate timing analysis. Any methodology that can
include more accurate and realistic Failure In Time (FIT) analysis and utilizes the
usefulness of temporal masking in the presence of variation can potentially reduce
the hardware overheads.
An open question will be: Do all the SEUs (bit-ips) really matter? Specula-
tive operations such as: Branch Prediction under Single-Event-Upsets, Memory
disambiguation under Single-Event-Upsets or in certain certain blocks can only
aect the performance without creating any functional error. Perhaps there is no
need to protect those blocks with TMR which results in less overhead. In the eld
of billion-transistors chips, the winning might go with an 'ART' (Architecturally
Radiation Tolerant). In other words, if in a processor with a certain radiation
tolerant architecture, Architecturally Correct Execution in the presence of Single-
Event-Upsets is achieved, then the savings especially in terms of area and power
will be very high particularly in non-safety-critical applications.
Another question is what will happens if there is a fault in the checker or controller
or 'who checks the checker?' Triplicating the controller would be absurd, because
that would imply a further checker, another further checker to check the previous
checker which can continue to innity. Clearly, therefore, any self-checking or
self-repairing system needs a reliable checker/controller that will be able to take
appropriate action if a fault develops in the system at large or within the controller
itself.
Simultaneous interactions of all of the aforementioned reliability issues, may dete-
riorate a single-ended mitigation technique. Such chaotic situations will even get
worse by further scaling down, power-lowering, and speed-up of semiconductors
considering the isolation of process/device engineers from circuit design engineers,
leading to some lack of understanding of the impact of their designs upon manu-
facturability and testability due to the fundamental imitations of technology and
device physics. This also necessitates the integration of novel methodologies and
EDA tools that can capture the full complexity of these problems for the next
generations of reliable circuits and systems.Appendix A
45nm DFF Schematic
The Schematic of the D Flip-Flop Cell used to determine the WOV in Chapter 4
is provided overleaf.
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Figure A.1: 45nm DFF - Transistor LevelReferences
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